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Abstract 
 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
The aim of the study was to assess whether Finnish companies reported more and higher-quality 
information after the adoption of IFRS 8. The study compares companies’ reporting under the 
previous standard IAS 14R to the level of disclosure under IFRS 8. In particular, the items of 
interest include the number of segments and segment line items, and the level of segment 
disaggregation and information about cross-segment transfers. In addition, the study examines 
the differences between early and regular adopters of the standard and investigates whether 
company size was related to the occurred reporting changes. 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The final sample of the study consists of 110 listed Finnish companies. The segment reporting data 
for these companies was hand-collected from their annual reports to be able to compare segment 
reporting under the same financial year. The research questions were examined using statistical 
analysis with SPSS software. The reporting variables under both standards were compared with 
non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-ranks test according to the normality test results. The early 
adoption effect was investigated with Mann-Whitney-U-test and a correlation analysis was 
conducted to examine the size effect. 
 
RESULTS 
 
The results show that IFRS 8 had little impact on the segment disaggregation or on the number of 
segment line items The only significant changes were the substantial decreases in the disclosure 
levels of assets, liabilities, capital expenditure and equity method income per segment. In addition, 
the results show that early adopters changed their reporting considerably more than the regular 
adopters, and that company size did not affect the way the standard was responded to. 
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TUTKIMUKSEN TAVOITTEET 
 
Tutkimuksen tavoite oli selvittää, muuttuiko suomalaisten yritysten segmenttiraportointi 
laadukkaammaksi uuden raportointistandardin IFRS 8:n myötä. Tutkimus vertailee yritysten 
raportointia edellisen standardin IAS 14R:n ja IFRS 8:n välillä. Kiinnostuksen kohteena ovat 
erityisesti raportoitujen segmenttien ja niitä kohti raportoitavien lukujen määrä, ja segmenttien 
erottelun taso sekä informaation määrä, jota raportointi antaa segmenttien välisistä 
transaktioista. Lisäksi tutkimus käsittelee eroja etuajassa standardin käyttöön ottaneiden 
yritysten raportoinnissa verrattuna muihin ja tutkii mikäli yrityksen koko vaikutti raportoinnin 
muutoksiin. 
 
AINEISTO JA TUTKIMUSMENETELMÄ 
 
Lopullinen aineisto koostui 110 suomalaisesta pörssiyrityksestä. Segmenttiraportointidata 
kerättiin käsin näiden yritysten vuosikertomuksista, jotta segmenttiraportointia voitiin verrata 
saman tilikauden ajalta. Tutkimuskysymyksiä tutkittiin tilastollisella analyysillä hyödyntäen 
SPSS-ohjelmaa. Raportointimuuttujia verrattiin Wilcoxonin testillä normaaliustestien tulosten 
mukaisesti. Etuajassa ja säännönmukaisesti standardin käyttöönottaneita yrityksiä verrattiin 
Mann-Whitney-U-testillä ja koon vaikutusta analysoitiin korrelaatioanalyysillä. 
 
TULOKSET 
 
Tulokset osoittavat että IFRS 8 ei vaikuttanut suomalaisyritysten raportoimien segmenttien 
lukumäärään eikä segmenteittäin raportoitujen erien määrään. Ainoat tilastollisesti merkitsevät 
muutokset havaittiin segmentin varojen, velkojen, investointien ja osakkuusyritysten tuloksen 
raportoinnissa, jotka laskivat merkittävästi. Tulokset kertovat lisäksi, että etuajassa standardin 
käyttöönottaneet yritykset muuttivat raportointiaan huomattavasti enemmän kuin muut, ja että 
yrityksen koolla ei ollut merkittävää vaikutusta siihen miten standardimuutokseen reagoitiin. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
 
The International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) see the main user of the 
financial statements to be the investor (Haaramo & Räty 2009). As companies have 
grown larger and larger in size, to be useful for investment decisions the financial 
statements need to contain information about the different components of the whole 
entity (Epstein & Jermakowicz 2008). This part of the financial statements is called 
segment reporting, where the company’s performance is cut into parts to help financial 
statement users identify the different risk and return profiles of these parts (Troberg et 
al. 2010). Good quality segment reporting reveals dissimilarities across the company 
and lowers the information asymmetry between the company owners and managers 
(Yoo & Semenenko 2012).  
 
Segment reporting requirements were first introduced to U.S. GAAP in 1976, and the 
IAS (now IFRS) followed in 1981. These requirements included reporting performance 
figures by the different industries and different geographic areas in which the company 
operated. However, the first standards in use, SFAS No. 14 and IAS 14, failed to satisfy 
the financial statement users’ needs, as the vast majority of companies claimed to 
operate in only one segment, even though this probably was not the case. To encourage 
more transparent reporting, the accounting standard setters FASB and IASC (now 
IASB) therefore revised their segment reporting standards and introduced tightened 
segment reporting requirements (Albrecht & Chipalkatti 1998.)  
 
SFAS No. 131, a new standard from FASB, came into force in 1997. It requires 
companies to report segments in the financial statements as they are reported internally 
to the management. This practice is referred to as the “management approach”. (FASB 
1997.) IASC on the other hand published IAS 14 Revised, which became mandatory as 
of 1998. According to the standard, a segment was a separate business or a geographic 
part of a company, which contained similar risk and return characteristics. This practice 
in segment reporting is called either the “industry approach” or the “risk and rewards –
  2 
approach”. (IASC 1997.) 
 
However, later as a part of the international convergence efforts between the U.S. 
GAAP and the IFRS standards, the FASB and the IASB began to bind their segment 
reporting requirements together (Nobes and Parker 2008). At the time a lot of research 
had been conducted on the effects that both SFAS No. 131 and IAS 14R had had on 
companies’ segment reporting. There was a consensus that SFAS No. 131 had resulted 
in a major change in segment reporting, as it was found that for example significantly 
more segments were reported, previously hidden information was released to the capital 
market and the value relevance of segment reporting increased (Berger & Hann 2003, 
Chen & Zhang 2003, Hermann & Thomas 2000). Even though IAS 14R was also found 
to marginally increase the number of segments and result in somewhat higher-quality 
reporting, its effect was considered to be a lot milder than of its American counterpart 
(Street & Nichols 2002, Maines et al. 1997).  
 
As such, the IASB draw a conclusion that the management approach produced more 
relevant information than the industry approach, and decided to converge with the U.S. 
standard (IASB 2006a). IFRS 8, a standard equal to the reporting requirements of SFAS 
No. 131 was released in 2006 and became obligatory in financial reporting from the 1st 
of January 2009 (IASB 2006b). Despite the benefits expected based on the research 
results on SFAS No. 131, not all were convinced that the IASB was making the right 
choice when converging with the U.S. approach. For example the European Parliament 
(2007) commented that the standard had been approved without truly assessing whether 
it suits to Europe and in particular there were claims that the standard would place 
smaller companies in a competitively disadvantageous situation (Crawford et al. 2012).  
 
Because of these mixed expectations, IFRS 8 became the first IFRS standard to be 
scrutinized under post-implementation review (PIR). The PIR process was finished in 
July 2013, and it included a comment letter process and investigation of academic 
research related to IFRS 8. (IASB 2013b.) Despite the review process being at end, little 
research exists on the effects of the standard. Primary research (e.g. Crawford et al. 
2012, Nichols et al. 2012) has found that IFRS 8 did succeed in some of its goals, for 
instance in increasing the average amount of segments reported. However, the research 
has focused on larger companies (Nichols et al. 2012), and results obtained in one 
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country cannot be generalized to another, as research shows that even though IFRS aims 
to harmonize accounting practices, national patterns in reporting still exist (Kvaal & 
Nobes 2012).  
 
The purpose of this research is to examine what changes occurred in segment reporting 
after the adoption of IFRS 8 in Finland. Finnish companies provide an interesting 
source for research for several reasons. Firstly, Finnish listed companies are relatively 
small in size and investigating changes in their reporting can therefore help to fill the 
research gap in this matter. This is important because in general it has been found that 
larger companies have greater incentives to disclose higher-quality information (Lang & 
Lundholm 1993). Therefore, as IFRS 8 was published as a standard that was specifically 
aimed to increase the amount of segment information, larger companies under severe 
scrutiny may have had more pressure to alter their segment reporting, which therefore 
could have biased the obtained results on IFRS 8.  
 
Secondly, Finnish companies have previously not been praised for the quality of their 
segment reporting. In fact, the Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority (FIN-FSA 
2007) reported that under the previous segment reporting standard IAS 14R the level of 
segment quality was unacceptably low, with one third of the companies reporting only 
one segment. They expressed hopes that the new standard would encourage also Finnish 
companies to report their segments more openly and thus it is interesting to see whether 
the segment reporting quality has increased. 
 
Finally, the effects of IFRS 8 to Finnish companies’ reporting have not yet been 
thoroughly examined.  Sjöman (2012) has investigated the quality effects of IFRS 8 in 
his master’s thesis, and found that no major changes had occurred. However, his 
research used a smaller (55) sample of Finnish companies and focused on quality 
indicators such as the amount of words used to describe segments. This research on the 
other hand primarily aims to give descriptive results on what specifically was reported 
under both standards and how it changed, thus providing new evidence on how IFRS 8 
affected Finnish companies’ segment reporting. 
  4 
1.2 Research Questions 
 
The aim of this study is to assess the changes in segment reporting in Finland after the 
adoption of IFRS 8. Most importantly, the purpose is to shed light on whether the 
standard change induced Finnish companies to report more and higher-quality segment 
information. The reporting changes are an interesting research subject, because with the 
introduction of SFAS No. 131 in the United States it was discovered that companies 
reported more segments, more line items per each segment and more information was 
available about value transfers between different segments (Berger & Hann 2003, 
Hermann & Thomas 2000, Street & Nichols 2000).  
 
Therefore, as a first research problem this study investigates whether these changes 
have also occurred in Finland after the adoption of the management approach. In 
particular, the research aims to give answers on what happened to the amount of 
segments and segment line items reported, which line items are reported and whether 
the new segment information is more disaggregated than before or gives more 
information about cross-segment transfers.  
 
IFRS 8 also offered an option to apply the standard in financial statements even before 
it became mandatory in 2009 (IASB 2006b). This group of companies is called the early 
adopters. Earlier research has not examined whether there are differences in the way 
early adopters reacted to the standard change compared to the regular adopters, and 
another research question of this study is whether some kind of an early adoption effect 
exists. 
 
The final problem addressed is the problem with company size. In general research has 
found that the quality of segment reporting is increasing with the company size (Lang & 
Lundholm 1993, Aitken et al. 1997, Ettredge et al. 2005). As explained above, the effect 
of IFRS 8 for smaller companies has not yet been investigated. Therefore it is 
interesting to examine whether the reporting changes done due to IFRS 8 are related to 
company size in this Finnish sample. 
 
 
 
 
 5 
1.3 Sample and Method 
 
The final sample of the study consists of 110 companies listed on the OMX Helsinki 
Stock Exchange. To control for other changes affecting segment reporting apart from 
the standard, the segment reporting data for these companies is hand-collected from 
their annual reports, so that original IAS 14R data is compared to the restated IFRS 8 
data for the same financial year. To further mitigate the possibility of contamination, the 
collected data is checked with an algorithm developed by Berger and Hann (2003) to 
ensure that no acquisition, divestiture etc. will affect the obtained results. 
 
The research questions are investigated with statistical analysis using SPSS software. 
The differences between the test variables under IAS 14R and IFRS 8 are tested with 
either a parametric t-test or a non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-ranks test based on 
results on normality tests. To investigate the possible early adoption effect, the results 
for early adopters are compared to the ones of the regular adopters by using an 
independent samples t-test or a non-parametric Mann-Whitney-U-test. To examine the 
size effect, correlation analysis is conducted. 
1.4 Results 
 
I found the overall impact of IFRS 8 to Finnish companies’ reporting to be mild. On 
average, there were no significant changes in the number of segments or the number of 
line items reported. Also the level of segment disaggregation and the amount of 
information conveyed about cross-segment transfers were found to stay fairly similar. 
However, the results show that while the overall decrease in the number of segment line 
items disclosed was not statistically significant, for some sole line items the disclosure 
levels dropped significantly. These items include segment assets, segment liabilities, 
capital expenditure and equity method income per segment. 
 
The results show a significant difference in the way early adopters and regular adopters 
reacted to the standard. The early adopters changed their segment reporting significantly 
more and to a more favorable direction than the regular adopters, thus supporting the 
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existence of an early adoption effect. The analysis concerning the company size showed 
that larger companies tended to report higher-quality segment information under both 
standards, but that the changes in reporting were not significantly related to company 
size. 
 
1.5 Structure of the Research 
 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section two highlights the historical 
development of segment reporting standards ending with the international convergence 
of the standards and the reasons behind the choice for the management approach. 
Section three discusses the observed impact of IFRS 8 from both an academic research 
and a practical viewpoint. Section four presents the research hypotheses, the sample and 
explains the methodology of the study. The empirical results are presented in section 
five, and I conclude the research in section 6. 
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2 SEGMENT REPORTING IN FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS 
2.1 Why Segment Reporting Exists? 
 
The need for segment reporting was noted first during the 1960s, when more and more 
companies became parts of a larger group of companies. Thus it became evident that the 
consolidated financial reporting alone was not sufficient to cover the growing 
information needs of equity investors, as important information was lost in the 
consolidation process. (Epstein & Jermakowicz 2008, Troberg 2007.) To tackle this 
problem, the international accounting standard setters, FASB and IASB, created 
segment reporting, which aims to “provide information about the different types of 
business activities in which an enterprise engages and the different economic 
environments in which it operates” (FASB 1997). 
 
From a company’s point of view, the motive to disclose segment information derives 
from the agency theory perspective, and its primary aim is to facilitate investors’ 
earnings predictions. As noted previously, when a company has diversified into 
segments whose profits do not correlate with each other, consolidated information does 
not provide useful information for investors for earnings forecasts purpose. (Aitken et 
al. 1997.) Companies however wish to overcome this problem, and include segment 
information in their financial statements because it reduces information asymmetries 
between the company owners and managers, and therefore lowers the cost of equity 
capital (Yoo & Semenenko 2012). 
 
Indeed, segment reporting has been developed as one of the specific disclosures 
required in the financial statements particularly intended for investors’ use (Haaramo & 
Räty 2009). When segment reporting quality is high, financial statement users can 
identify the risk and return profiles of the different segments, and therefore better 
understand the organization as a whole (Troberg et al. 2010). Segment reporting should 
reveal companies’ diversification strategies and its transfers of resources across its 
segments (Berger & Hann 2007). In a nutshell, useful segment reporting reveals 
dissimilarities inside the company to its investors (Troberg et al. 2010). 
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As segment reporting was developed for investors at their own request, it is self-evident 
that they consider segment information as one of the most valuable pieces of 
information for their decision making (Yoo & Semenenko 2012). For instance, in their 
survey of 140 sell-side analysts, Epstein and Palepu (1999) found that segment data is 
considered to be the most useful for investment decisions from all annual report 
information. Segment information was found to provide the analysts with additional 
insight into the past and future operating performance of both the company as a whole 
and by segment. Indeed, 93 % of the survey respondents claimed that they would prefer 
even more complete disclosure of product line and segment profitability.  
 
2.2 The Evolution of Segment Reporting Standards 
 
2.2.1 The First Standards and the Fundamental Problem of Segment Reporting 
 
FASB issued its first segment reporting standard, SFAS No. 14, in 1976. This standard 
specified a segment as a relevant industry segment in which the company did business 
or a geographic area where the company had operations. The determination of which 
industries or geographic areas were considered as “relevant” for reporting was left to the 
companies themselves. A similar standard, IAS 14, was released by IASB in 1981. 
(Albrecht & Chipalkatti 1998.)  
 
However, these standards were later found to be insufficient and too general in their 
reporting requirements. Most importantly, financial statement users felt that many 
companies took advantage of the vagueness of the standards, as they allowed the 
companies to decide which segments were relevant enough for reporting. Therefore, 
companies chose to report fewer segments than the investors would have preferred. At 
the time in the United States, 43 % of companies reaching revenues of 1 billion dollars 
reported only one segment. (Albrecht & Chipalkatti 1998.) 
 
These findings highlighted the fundamental problem of segment reporting. This is the 
trade-off between informing the financial statement users with high-quality segment 
disclosures to lower the cost of equity capital and the benefit of not revealing this 
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information to avoid proprietary and/or agency costs (Troberg et al. 2010). Academic 
research has found support for both the proprietary and agency cost hypotheses, thus 
explaining why companies behaved as they did when the relevance of segments was left 
to their own hands and was not guided in a stricter manner by the segment reporting 
standards. 
 
If a company withholds segment information for proprietary cost reasons, it means that 
it fears to reveal information about profitable markets to its competitors (Troberg et al. 
2010). Upon the disclosure of these profitable segments, more competition could enter 
to that particular market and hence decrease the level of profitability the company is 
currently enjoying (Berger & Hann 2007). Other possible negative outcomes include the 
increased bargaining power of the company suppliers and customers (Ettredge et al. 
2002a). For instance, suppliers could try to identify in which segment they could ask for 
higher prices (Ettredge et al. 2002b). Therefore, in the presence of proprietary costs 
company managers would not disclose segments with high profits in their financial 
reporting. (Berger & Hann 2007.) 
 
Hayes and Lundholm (1996) provided the first evidence to support the proprietary cost 
hypothesis. They investigated how companies choose the appropriate level of their 
segment reporting, given that the disclosures are scrutinized both by competitors and the 
capital market. They found that under severe competition, companies maximized their 
value when they reported all segments with similar results. If the segment results were 
dissimilar, companies would not disclose them separately but aggregated them into a 
single segment to protect the higher profitability of one of the segments.  
 
Later, many other researchers have reported similar findings. Botosan and Stanford 
(2005) found that companies hided segments that operated in less competitive industries 
than the company’s primary industry and thus protected the abnormal profits obtained 
from these segments. Wang, Ettredge, Kwon and Smith (2011) reported that for those 
segments with high abnormal profitability, high industry concentration or low barriers 
to entry, the probability that a company would withhold from reporting this segment 
was increased. Also Harris (1998) found that company managers tended to conceal 
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segments which earned higher rates of return on average and which had higher potential 
for abnormal profit persistence. 
 
On the other hand, it is also possible that the companies’ lack of enthusiasm to disclose 
more segments is due to agency cost reasons. The agency cost hypothesis assumes that 
segment information is withheld because of conflicts of interest between the company 
shareholders and its managers (Berger & Hann 2007). The managers do not want to 
reveal such information to shareholders that would indicate underperformance, i.e. they 
withhold from disclosing the value-reducing aspects of a company’s diversification 
strategy (Bens et al. 2011). Therefore, upon the existence of agency costs, the company 
managers would not disclose segments with low profits to their financial reports (Berger 
& Hann 2007). 
 
Lang and Lundholm (1993) were the first to give inclination of this kind of behavior, 
when they documented that the probability of disclosure is higher when the company is 
performing well rather than when it’s performing poorly. Berger and Hann (2007) 
confirmed these findings by documenting that when the financial reporting standards 
allowed, company managers concealed low-performing segments with the objective to 
hide negative information from the company shareholders. Similarly, both Wang, 
Ettredge, Kwon and Smith (2011) and Bens, Berger and Monahan (2011) reported that 
segment disclosure was positively associated with segment profitability.  
 
As seen by these results and also already earlier in practice, companies had many 
reasons to disclose fewer segments than would have been beneficial to investors. As this 
was the case the financial reporting standard setters needed to consider these incentives 
for companies to reveal or withhold information about underlying performance of the 
separate business activities, and adjust their standards accordingly (Hayes & Lundholm 
1996). As requested by the public, both FASB and IASB began to revise their segment 
reporting requirements with the particular aim to increase the number of segments 
companies reported, and arrived to two different suggestions to solve the problems of 
the previous segment reporting standards. 
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2.2.2 IAS 14 Revised 
 
Besides being criticized for allowing too broad management judgment in defining the 
reportable segments, IAS 14 was blamed for allowing companies to report dissimilar 
countries grouped as one geographic segment, not requiring enough items per segment 
to be disclosed and that the segments reported did not correspond to the company’s 
internal reporting structure (Street & Nichols 2002). To meet the increasing needs of the 
international financial analyst community, the IASB (then the IASC) therefore set forth 
to revise its segment reporting standard and tightened the standard’s definition of a 
reportable segment (Albrecht & Chipalkatti 1998).  
 
The first draft of IAS 14 Revised was published in 1995, and it ultimately became 
effective from financial periods starting on or after 1st of July 1998. The standard 
introduced a risk and rewards –approach to segment reporting, which implied that what 
was reported as one segment had to contain only those operations, which had similar 
risk and reward characteristics. (Street & Nichols 2002.) 
 
The basis of IAS 14R was that it required companies to report segments both by line-of-
business (LOB) and geographically, therefore utilizing a two-tier approach in segment 
reporting. Companies had to choose which of these options was reported as the primary 
segments, based on their internal management structure. If a company was organized 
neither by product/service lines nor by geographic region, companies had to determine 
whether the primary source of their risks and rewards rose from the differences of their 
products/services or from the differences of the countries it had operations in. (IASC 
1997.) 
 
The choice of the primary and secondary segment was vital, because the reporting 
requirements IAS 14R set for the primary segments were considerably heavier than for 
the secondary segments. The original IAS 14 only required the reporting of segment 
revenue, result, assets and the basis for inter-segment pricing. As discussed, these 
requirements were found insufficient, and IAS 14R required a lot more items to be 
disclosed. (Street & Nichols 2002.) 
 
  12 
For the primary segments, IAS 14R explicitly required reporting of external and internal 
revenue, segment result, segment assets and liabilities, the basis for inter-segment 
pricing, capital expenditure, depreciation and other non-cash expenses, equity method 
income and investment and reconciliation of all these items to the consolidated amounts 
reported. For the secondary segments the required items included external revenue, 
segment assets and capital expenditure. (IASC 1997.) 
 
Besides tightening the definition of what was allowed to be reported inside one 
segment, IAS 14R also included a relevancy threshold for segment determination. This 
was a further attempt to reduce the possibility for management judgment in assessing 
which segments were relevant enough for reporting. All in all, IAS 14R required 
companies to report as segments a minimum of 75 % of all consolidated external 
revenue. About an individual segment the standard stated that it had to be reported, if: 
- its external revenues constituted a minimum of 10 % of all segment revenue 
- its profit or loss constituted a minimum of 10 % of all segment result 
- its assets constituted a minimum of 10 % of all segment assets. (IASC 1997.) 
 
All these requirements where hoped to encourage companies to report more segments 
than under the original IAS 14. The standard was also expected to result in companies 
reporting more specific geographic areas and reporting more segment line items per 
segment. (McConnell & Pacter 1995.) 
 
2.2.3 SFAS No. 131 
 
While the IASB chose a risk and rewards –approach for segment definition, the FASB 
concluded that the most important thing was to get companies report segments as they 
were reported internally. This decision was largely influenced by a report conducted by 
the Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR 1993), which stated 
that more accurate investment decisions could be made if segment reporting reflected 
the way a company was managed and organized. As a result, the FASB introduced the 
management approach to segment reporting, and published a new segment reporting 
standard SFAS No. 131 in 1997, which was effective for fiscal periods starting on or 
after 15th of December 1997 (Albrecht & Chipalkatti 1998). 
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Determining segments with a management approach means that the segments are 
reported according to the company’s internal management structure. According to the 
standard, a reportable operating segment is a component of a company which: 
- engages in business activities from which it drives revenues and incurs expenses 
- has its operating result regularly reviewed by the chief operating decision maker 
of the company 
- has discrete financial information available. (FASB 1997.) 
 
Of great importance in determining the segments is who is the chief operating decision 
maker (CODM) of the company. SFAS No. 131 states that this is more a function and 
not first and foremost a person. The CODM is the function in the company which 
decides how to allocate resources between segments and who also makes judgments 
about their performance. (FASB 1997.) For instance, this function could be the CEO or 
the COO, but also a group of company executives (Albrecht & Chipalkatti 1998). 
 
Like IAS 14R, also SFAS No. 131 increased the segment line item reporting 
requirements. The only line items explicitly required are segment profitability measure, 
segment revenue, segment assets and reconciliation from these amounts to the 
consolidated reporting, meaning that the requirements of IAS 14R were more broad. 
However, SFAS No. 131 also requires the disclosure of the following segment line 
items, if they are included in the segment profitability measure disclosed or otherwise 
regularly reviewed by the CODM: 
- external and internal revenue 
- interest revenue and expense 
- depreciation, depletion and amortization expense 
- non-recurring items 
- equity method income and investment 
- income tax expense or benefit 
- other non-cash expenses 
- capital expenditure. (FASB 1997.) 
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A major change from the first segment reporting standard was also that the segment line 
item amounts should be reported in the same manner as they are reported to the CODM. 
This means that they do not have to account to GAAP principles. In addition, SFAS No. 
131 holds the same quantitative thresholds for determining reportable segments as IAS 
14R, but also provides additional segment aggregation criteria. These criteria state that 
two segments can only be aggregated into one if they have similar economic 
characteristics and are also similar when examined by each of the following: 
- the nature of the products and services 
- the nature of the production processes 
- the type or class of customer for their products and services 
- the methods of distribution for their products and services 
- if applicable, the nature of the regulatory environment. (FASB 1997.) 
 
A final major diversion from the old standard was the addition of enterprise-wide 
disclosures to segment reporting. These disclosures include information on the 
company’s products and services, information about geographical areas and information 
about major customers. For each product or service, or a group of similar products or 
services, companies must report the revenue information from external customers. 
Geographic information includes the requirement to disclose revenue and asset 
information by the country of domicile and by all material individual countries. 
Information about major customers means that companies must mention if a segment’s 
revenues includes a customer accounting for more than 10 % of the total revenue of that 
segment. (FASB 1997.) The requirement of reporting revenues by the country of 
domicile and by all material individual countries was expected to result in more specific 
geographic disclosures (Tsakumis et al. 2006).   
 
The reaction to the introduction of the management approach to segment reporting in 
the United States was mostly positive. SFAS No. 131 was expected to enable financial 
statement users to “see the company through the eyes of its management”, and therefore 
more accurately forecast managerial actions and their effects on the future cash flows of 
the company. In addition, the standard was expected to lower reporting costs for 
companies, as they could use their internal reporting as a basis for external segment 
reporting. (Albrecht & Chipalkatti 1998.) 
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2.3 The International Convergence 
 
IASB and FASB started their short-term convergence project in 2002, with the aim to 
reduce the differences in the financial reporting requirements of the two most-used sets 
of accounting principles (Nobes & Parker 2008). As a part of this project, the segment 
reporting standards of both regimes were taken under examination, and academic 
research findings on both of the standards were investigated (IASB 2006a, BC3). Based 
on these results, a conclusion could be made on which standard produced more relevant 
information and whether the IFRS should converge to U.S. GAAP and change the 
segment reporting principle to the management approach. 
2.3.1 IAS 14 Revised vs. SFAS No. 131 
 
As discussed, both IAS 14R and SFAS No. 131 were responses to the criticism that 
companies in general tended to report too few segments and deliberately hided 
information that would be useful for financial statement users. Therefore it was first 
important to assess whether the standards fulfilled their goal of increasing both the 
number of segments and segment line items reported. 
 
A vast body of academic research concludes that SFAS No. 131 had a major effect to 
segment reporting in the United States. For example, both Hermann and Thomas (2000) 
and Street, Nichols and Gray (2000) found that over half of the companies in their 
sample increased their number of reported segments, while a small minority of less than 
10 % decreased the number of segments. Berger and Hann (2003) further confirmed 
these findings with a larger sample. They reported that the number of multi-segment 
companies increased in their sample from 22 % to 40 %, and only less than 2 % of the 
sample decreased the amount of segments reported. 
 
Regarding IAS 14R similar findings were reported, but overall the effect of the new 
standard was considered to be milder. Street and Nichols (2002) reported that in their 
sample 23 % of companies reported more segments, but for the majority the amount of 
segments reported stayed the same as under the previous standard. Also Prather-Kinsey 
and Meek (2004) found a marginal increase in the number of reported segments, with 
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approximately half of the sample changing the number of business and geographic 
segments reported. 
 
This same effect was found for both standards also regarding the segment line items. 
Hermann and Thomas (2000) documented an increase in the mean number of segment 
line items reported after the adoption of SFAS No. 131. They found most significant 
increases in the reporting of tax expense, interest expense and revenue, non-cash items 
and equity method investment and income. Respectively for IAS 14R, Prather-Kinsey 
and Meek (2004) and Street and Nichols (2002) reported increased number of segment 
line items, with major increases in the reporting of capital expenditure, depreciation, 
segment liabilities, non-cash items and equity method income. However, neither SFAS 
No. 131 nor IAS 14R succeeded in increasing the disclosure of research and 
development expenditure by segment (Hermann & Thomas 2000, Street & Nichols 
2002). 
 
Secondly, the impact the standards had on geographic segment disclosures has to be 
evaluated, as part of the criticism for the old ones included a notion that the geographic 
areas reported were too large in size and not specific enough (Nichols et al. 2000). Both 
Hermann and Thomas (2000) and Nichols, Street and Gray (2000) reported that SFAS 
No. 131 increased the number of individual country segments. For example, Nichols, 
Street and Gray (2000) found that the percentage of companies reporting country-
specific geographic segment information rose from 4 % to 28 %. They argue that this 
increase should facilitate making more accurate sales forecasts. 
 
For IAS 14R the results however were not as promising. Street and Nichols (2002) 
reported that most of their sample companies continued to report their geographic 
segments under similar vague groupings used under IAS 14, and only 16 % were found 
to report country-specific information, compared to the 28 % under SFAS No. 131. 
 
Thirdly, as the first segment reporting standards were stated to leave too much room for 
company management judgment, it is interesting to see whether the new standards 
succeeded in narrowing this flexibility in segment determination. For SFAS No. 131, 
the academic research concludes that it forced companies to reveal previously hidden 
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segments, therefore succeeding in reducing possibilities for managerial judgment. Again 
for IAS 14R, the results are less convincing. 
 
Berger and Hann (2007) found that company managers used the flexibility under SFAS 
No. 14 to conceal low-performing segments, which they were then forced to report after 
the adoption of SFAS No. 131. In contrast, Botosan and Stanford (2005) found that 
managers used the flexibility of SFAS No. 14 to hide segments with high abnormal 
profits, and that many multi-segment companies masqueraded themselves as single-
segment companies under SFAS No. 14. Therefore, it seems that irrespectively of 
whether companies hided segments for proprietary or agency costs reasons, SFAS No. 
131 imposed such strict guidelines for segment determination, that companies had to 
report their segments more openly. 
 
Nichols and Street (2007) investigated whether IAS 14R also succeeded in reducing the 
flexibility of management to hide useful segment information from financial statement 
users. Their findings indicated that the flexibility of segment determination had 
persisted even after IAS 14R, as the new standard still allowed managers to combine 
segments to protect excess returns, therefore again implying that the management 
approach of SFAS No. 131 proved to be more successful than the risks and rewards -
approach.  
 
In addition to these results, it seems that SFAS No. 131 topped IAS 14R when it comes 
to how the standards affected the financial analysts’ perceived reliability of segment 
information. Maines, McDaniel and Harris (1997) reported that segment reporting was 
perceived as more reliable when external and internal segments were aligned, thus 
supporting the management approach of SFAS No. 131. In addition, this reliability was 
not decreased even when these segments contained dissimilar products, as long as they 
were reported according to the internal reporting structure of the company. The results 
suggested that the management approach of SFAS No. 131 increased investors’ 
confidence that the management does not obscure necessary segment information, but 
that this same effect could not be found to be true for IAS 14R. In a similar manner, 
also Chen and Zhang (2003) have documented that the value relevance of segment data 
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is higher when the same data is also used for internal management decisions, further 
supporting the management approach in segment reporting. 
 
2.3.2 Additional Research on SFAS No. 131 
 
Besides the comparison of the academic research results presented in the previous 
chapter, the IASB also investigated additional research done on SFAS No. 131 (IASB 
2006a, BC3). This research includes information on the effects that the standard had on 
financial analysts’ information environment and the security market effects associated 
with the adoption of the management approach. These research results are discussed 
next. 
 
Berger and Hann (2003) provided a comprehensive view on what effect the new 
standard had on analysts’ information environment. Their results indicated that while 
the analysts did know some of the SFAS No. 131 information even before its release, 
for those companies that did change their reporting practices, the analysts’ forecasts 
errors dropped significantly, from 2.41 % to 1.94 % of price. The new standard 
particularly enhanced analysts’ earnings forecasts. The researchers argued that this 
meant that the analysts were unaware of a significant portion of the segment data before 
the introduction of SFAS No. 131. 
 
Overall, Berger and Hann (2003) suggested that the level of segment disaggregation 
improved with the introduction of SFAS No. 131, and at the same time it informed 
financial statement users of the previously hidden company diversification strategies 
and resource transfers across segments. These changes were found to affect the market 
valuation and company behaviour and therefore they implied that the new standard 
facilitated external monitoring purposes, thus improving the information environment. 
 
Many researchers have then arrived to the same conclusions. Botosan and Stanford 
(2005) found a significant increase in the consensus of analysts’ estimates after SFAS 
No. 131. According to the researchers this suggested an increased reliance on public 
information. Also Wang, Ettredge, Huang and Sun (2011) reported increased segment 
disaggregation levels since greater gross-segment variability in growth rates were 
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reported post-SFAS No. 131. On the other hand Ettredge, Kwon, Smith and Stone 
(2006) documented an increased variability in reported segment profits, which implied 
that new information about company diversity was released with SFAS No. 131. 
 
On top of this vast research done on the effects that line-of-business segment reporting 
had on analysts’ information environment, Hope, Thomas and Winterbotham (2006) 
addressed the changes due to new geographic information.  They found that even when 
companies had stopped disclosing geographic segment earnings under the new standard, 
the analysts’ future earnings forecasts errors were not significantly affected, thus 
supporting the wording of the SFAS No. 131. In addition, Behn, Nichols and Street 
(2002) showed a significant increase in the predictive accuracy of geographic segment 
disclosures under SFAS No. 131 compared to its predecessor. The researchers argued 
that this improvement might be due to the new requirement to disclose sales by country, 
in comparison to the vague groupings often used under SFAS No. 14.  
 
Also the security market effects of SFAS No. 131 were widely found to be positive. 
Ettredge, Kwon, Smith and Zarowin (2005) investigated whether the adoption of SFAS 
No. 131 resulted in an increase in the stock market’s ability to predict companies’ future 
earnings. To address the problem, the researchers investigated the association between 
current-year stock returns and next-year corporate earnings. Their results showed a 
significant increase in the future earnings response coefficient for all other companies 
than single-segment companies that remained single-segment also under SFAS No. 131. 
Also for those companies that did not increase their number of reported segments or 
even decreased it the increase in the coefficient is significant, implying that SFAS No. 
131 also had qualitative effects on top of quantitative ones. In conclusion, the 
researchers stated that the stock price informativeness was increased and more 
information to the capital market about future earnings was reported. 
 
Also Park (2011) investigated the relevance and usefulness of SFAS No. 131 for the 
stock market, specifically the extent to which it improved the stock prices’ anticipation 
of industry-wide and firm-specific components of future earnings. The study focused on 
companies that increased the number of segment reported post-SFAS No. 131 and 
examined what kind of an effect this had on the association between current stock price 
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and future earnings. The results indicated that SFAS No. 131 facilitated the predicting 
of the industry-wide component of future earnings for companies that had previously 
aggregated their segment information. The results therefore suggested that the new 
standard provided new and insightful information about the reported segments, and 
improved the intra-industry information transfer in the stock market. 
 
On the geographic segment side, Hope, Kang, Thomas and Vasvari (2008) investigated 
whether investors’ pricing of foreign earnings changed after the adoption of SFAS No. 
131. More specifically, they examined whether the earnings response coefficient (ERC) 
increased after the adoption of the new standard and whether previously documented 
market mispricing was decreased. Their results concluded that foreign ERCs increased 
significantly after the introduction of SFAS No. 131 and that the mispricing effect 
observed in the pre-SFAS No. 131 period disappeared after the adoption. The 
researchers therefore drove a conclusion that SFAS No. 131 succeeded in enhancing the 
value relevance of foreign earnings numbers, and that investors discounted foreign 
earnings before because companies had poor segment disclosure levels under SFAS No 
14. 
 
To summarize the research results on both SFAS No. 131 and IAS 14R, Table 1 
presents the observed effects for both standards. 
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SFAS No. 131 IAS 14R
- Majority changed the no of 
segments reported
- Minority changed the no of 
segments reported
- On average the amount of 
segments increased
- On average the amount of 
segments increased
(Hermann & Thomas 2000, Street et 
al. 2000, Berger & Hann 2003)
(Street & Nichols 2002, Prather-
Kinsey & Meek 2004)
- On average the amount of line 
items increased
- On average the amount of 
line items increased
(Hermann & Thomas 2000) (Street & Nichols 2002, Prather-
Kinsey & Meek 2004)
- On average the amount of 
segments increased
- On average the amount of 
segments increased
(Hermann & Thomas 2000, Nichols et 
al. 2000)
(Street & Nichols 2002)
- Decreased, companies reported 
previously hidden high- and low-
performing segments
- Did not change, flexibility in 
segment determination 
persisted
(Berger & Hann 2007, Botosan & 
Stanford 2005)
(Nichols & Street 2007)
- Increased perceived reliability 
and value relevance
- No observable change
(Maines et al. 1997, Cheng & Zhang 
2003)
(Maines et al. 1997)
- Decreased analyst forecast 
errors
n/a
- New information about company 
diversification strategies
- Increase in the predictive 
accuracy of geographic 
disclosures
(Berger & Hann 2003, Ettredge et al. 
2006, Behn et al. 2002)
- Increased stock price 
informativeness
n/a
- More information about future 
earnings conveyed
- Enchanced value relevance of 
foreign earnings
(Ettredge et al. 2005, Hope et al. 
2008)
Room for management 
judgment
Reliability of segment 
information
Effect on analyst information 
environment
Security market effects
TABLE 1.
Summary of Academic Research Results on SFAS No. 131 and IAS 14R
No of segments
No of segment line items
No of geographic segments
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2.3.3 IFRS 8 
 
After detailed investigation of the research results presented above and discussions with 
financial statement users, the IASB noted five primary benefits that it expected if IFRS 
was to converge with the management approach of SFAS No. 131. Firstly, that 
companies would report segments corresponding to the internal management reports; 
secondly, that companies would report segment information more consistent with other 
parts of the annual reports; thirdly, that some companies would report more segments; 
fourthly, that more interim segment information would be reported and finally, that the 
cost of providing segment information would be reduced as two sets of segment 
reporting would no longer be required. (IASB 2006a, BC8.) 
 
As a possible disadvantage of the management approach the IASB noted that some 
companies might report segment information that would not be reported in accordance 
of the general accounting principles, thus damaging the credibility of the financial 
statements. The Board however stated that this kind of reporting would be unlikely, as 
companies were not likely to have two sets of accounting policies in use. Therefore the 
Board concluded that the advantages of the management approach of SFAS No. 131 far 
exceeded the possible disadvantages, and proposed that the IFRS should converge with 
the American approach. (IASB 2006a, BC9-BC12.) 
 
After this conclusion, the IASB published the Exposure Draft 8 in 2006, which later 
became the new segment reporting standard IFRS 8: “Operating Segments”. The 
requirements of IFRS 8 are the same as the previously presented SFAS No. 131 (see p. 
12-14), with only slight deviations. The only notable difference to SFAS No. 131 is that 
IFRS 8 only explicitly requires the disclosure of segment profitability measure for each 
segment, whereas SFAS No. 131 also requires the disclosure of segment assets. The 
disclosure of segment assets becomes compulsory under IFRS 8 if it is regularly 
provided to the chief operating decision maker (CODM) of the company. (IASB 
2006b.) 
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Companies using IFRS have had to use IFRS 8 as their segment reporting regime from 
financial years beginning on or after 1st of January 2009. The standard also offered a 
possibility for early adoption, i.e. changing the segment reporting from IAS 14R to 
IFRS 8 even before this date. (IASB 2006b.) 
 
2.3.4 The Differences between IAS 14 Revised and IFRS 8 
 
The main difference between IAS 14R and IFRS 8 is in the way they define a reportable 
segment. In the new standard, segments are defined from the management perspective 
and segment reporting is based on a company’s internal reporting (Epstein & 
Jermakowicz 2008). In IAS 14R segments were divided to primary and secondary 
segments, which were either line-of-business or geographic segments. The decision 
whether geographic or line-of-business segments were reported as primary segments 
was based on which of the two was the main cause of risks and return rates for the 
company. (Nirkkonen 2006.) IFRS 8 also differs from IAS 14R in the disclosure 
requirements of segment line items, as the only mandatory item to disclose is the 
segment profit (IASB 2006b), whereas IAS 14R required multiple segment line items 
(IASC 1997). 
 
It is also important to note that while IAS 14R defined segments as either line-of-
business segments or geographic segments, under IFRS 8 it is possible to report 
segments in numerous different ways (Nichols et al. 2012). The segments could be 
arranged for instance based on the legal entities of the company. Therefore, the 
segments reported under IAS 14R and IFRS 8 might not be directly comparable.  
 
Another important change was the decision to allow non-IFRS measures in segment 
reporting, as in IFRS 8 the segment line items need to be reported exactly as they are 
reported to the Chief Operating Decision Maker of the company, even if they were non-
IFRS measures. In IAS 14R the segment reporting figures were reported with the same 
accounting principles as the other parts of the financial statements. (Epstein & 
Jermakowicz 2008.) 
 
  24 
Furthermore, the entity-wide disclosures introduced in IFRS 8 were also a new 
requirement. They were developed to compensate for the possible loss of information 
that could occur as companies were no longer required to report two types of segments 
(both geographic and line-of-business). IFRS 8 therefore requires companies to report 
information on their products and services, their main countries of operations and on 
major customers, as explained previously on page 14. (IASB 2006b.) 
 
Table 2 summarizes the main characteristics of both segment reporting standards. 
 
IAS 14R IFRS 8
Approach Risk and rewards approach Management approach
Identification of 
segments
Normally the identification is based on 
a company’s internal organizational 
and financial reporting structure.
The identification is based on internal 
reports that are regularly reviewed by 
the chief operating decision maker 
(CODM).
Definition of 
segments
A distinguishable component of a 
company that is subject to different 
risks and return rates from other 
segments. 
A business component whose 
operating results the CODM regularly 
reviews to allocate resources and 
assess performance, and for which 
discrete financial information is 
available.
Types of segment Business and geographic. Operating segments. 
Measurement 
Segment information is prepared in 
accordance with the accounting 
policies of IFRS. The standard defines 
how segment revenue, expense, result 
assets and liabilities are calculated.
Segment information is reported as it is 
reported to the CODM, thus IFRS 
measures are not required. An 
explanation of how segment results 
and assets are measured is required.
General information 
disclosures
Types of activity in each business 
segment and composition of each 
geographic segment.
Factors used in identifying the 
reportable segments and types of 
activities from which the segment earns 
revenues.
Primary segment reconciliations: Operating segments reconciliations:
-       Segment revenue to total revenue 
from external customers
-       Segment revenue to total revenue
-       Segment result to total result -       Segment result to total result
-       Segment assets to total assets -       Segment assets to total assets
-       Segment liabilities to total liabilities -       Segment liabilities (if reported) to 
total liabilities
TABLE 2.
IAS 14R vs. IFRS 8. Adapted from Crawford et al. (2012).
Reconciliation
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IAS 14R IFRS 8
Primary segment: Operating segments:
-       Segment revenue from external 
customers
-       Segment result
-       Segment revenue from other 
segments
Disclosure required if included in 
segment result and/or reviewed by 
CODM:
-       Segment result from continuing 
and discontinuing operations
-       Segment assets
-       Segment assets -       Segment liabilities
-       Segment liabilities
-       Segment revenue from external 
customers
-       Capital expenditure
-       Segment revenue from other 
segments
-       Depreciation and amortization -       Interest revenue and expense
-       Significant non-cash expenses -       Depreciation and amortization 
-       Share of result and investment in 
equity method investments
-       Other material income/expense 
items
Secondary segment: -       Share of result and investment in 
equity method investments
-       Segment revenue to external 
customers
-       Income tax expense or income
-       Carrying amount of segment 
assets
-       Significant non-cash expenses
-       Capital expenditure
Disclosure consistent with the 
company’s financial statements:
-       Revenue from external customers 
for each product or service
-       Information about geographical 
areas: revenue from external 
customers attributed to and the non-
current assets for the entity’s country 
of domicile and to all foreign 
countries in total
-       Information about major 
customers: revenue from significant 
customers and segments reporting 
that revenue
TABLE 2.
IAS 14R vs. IFRS 8. Adapted from Crawford et al. (2012).
Segment disclosures 
required
Entity-wide 
disclosures
n/a
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3 THE IMPACT OF IFRS 8 
3.1 Reactions to Exposure Draft 8 
 
The publishing of Exposure Draft 8 that later became the new segment reporting 
standard IFRS 8 in 2006 started a heated discussion on the possible benefits and 
disadvantages of the management approach, and thus segment reporting became a hot 
topic in the financial accounting world (Nobes & Parker 2008). Despite disagreements 
over whether the decision to converge with the U.S. standard was a good one, the 
overall expectation was that IFRS 8 would lead to increased segment disclosure as well 
as to greater corporate transparency (Katselas et al. 2011).  
 
In the Basis for Conclusions for ED 8, the IASB argues that the management approach 
could improve the user’s ability to predict actions or reactions by company management 
that could have a significant effect on the company’s prospects for future cash flows 
(IASB 2006a, BC5). However, some expressed concerns that the American approach 
would not fit into the countries using IFRS standards. For instance, Albrecht and 
Chipalkatti (1998) have noted that the management approach might not suit a reporting 
system that operates in different financial reporting environments. As companies using 
the IFRS operate in different countries under different regulatory requirements, 
management styles differ from country to country, and therefore the way the segments 
would be determined would also differ. This is turn would result in the lack of 
comparability between companies (Crawford et al. 2012).  
 
The European Parliament (2007) also had its doubts whether the management approach 
would fit into Europe, and commented that “convergence of accounting is not a one-
sided process where one party simply copies the financial reporting standards of the 
other party”. They feared that the implementation of IFRS 8 had been done without 
addressing the needs of small and medium-sized companies, which are more common in 
Europe than in the United States. The parliament also stated that as IFRS 8 did not 
anymore specifically require geographic segment disclosures, the amount of geographic 
information could therefore decrease in relation to IAS 14R.  
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Especially the size differences between European and American companies provoked 
comments about the adoption of the management approach. Some were worried that 
after IFRS 8 companies would be forced to reveal commercially sensitive information, 
that could be especially harmful for smaller entities, as after releasing the information it 
might be obvious with whom these companies were dealing with in key areas. The 
commenters stated that these smaller companies were in a fragile state and needed 
protection in order to grow and thus should be excluded from releasing commercially 
disadvantageous segment information. (Crawford et al. 2012.)  
 
For example the organization for British small listed companies, The Quoted 
Companies Alliance (QCA 2006) commented that IFRS 8 would place smaller 
companies at a disadvantage compared to larger ones. They argued that the academic 
research results obtained in the United States could not be considered as proof of the 
benefits of the management approach in this case, as European companies are much 
smaller when they are listed than the U.S. ones. In addition they stated that in the worst 
case scenario the adoption of the standard would lead to companies having two sets of 
managerial reports, out of which one would be used internally and the other for external 
reporting.  
 
Other concerns concerning IFRS 8 also included the fact that the information provided 
would not be useful for stewardship and external user decisions, as it was prepared for 
internal use. The term CODM was also feared to cause misjudgments, and others did 
not like the possibility to report segment information using non-IFRS measures. 
(Crawford et al. 2012.) The use of non-IFRS measures and the fact that IFRS 8 does not 
specifically define the measure for segment profit or loss were the reasons that drove 
three of the IASB members to vote against the convergence. The board members 
suggested that the use of non-IFRS measures would be misleading and result in non-
consistent reporting. (IASB 2006a, AV2-AV5.) Also Hussain (2007) noted that as 
companies go through internal restructurings quite often, the reported segments might 
differ every year.  
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However, also SFAS No. 131 received negative reactions upon its release in the United 
States. Especially companies themselves were against it, as for example Ettredge, Kwon 
and Smith (2002a) documented that 85 % of companies that sent comment letters to 
FASB regarding the new standard were against it. This was later found out to be 
because they expected that the standard would make them report more segment 
information. 
 
In a similar manner, Katselas, Birt and Kang (2011) investigated the comment letters 
received from the Exposure Draft 8 and hypothesized that a company’s lobbying 
position towards the increased mandatory disclosure under IFRS 8 would be aligned 
with the perceived benefits and costs from the increased disclosure. Accordingly, they 
documented that companies, which reported only two or fewer segments under IAS 
14R, were against the new standard, indicating that they feared the possibility of 
revealing proprietary information to the market in the form of increased disclosure. 
Thus, the general expectation that IFRS 8 would increase the quantity of segment 
disclosures was acceptable, despite the faced criticism.   
 
3.2 Changes in Segment Reporting Information 
 
The research done on the effects that the introduction of IFRS 8 has until date primarily 
focused on larger companies and the descriptive changes the new standard brought into 
segment reporting information. While conducting their post-implementation review 
(PIR) of IFRS 8 the IASB has noted that based on the academic research results on 
general a large number of companies have not changed the amount of segments 
reported. On average however, the number of reported segments has not decreased and 
when a change in the reporting practice did occur, it was more likely an increase than a 
decrease. (IASB 2013a.) 
 
Crawford, Extance, Helliar and Power (2012) investigated a sample of 150 U.K. 
companies to address the changes IFRS 8 had resulted in. They reported an increase in 
the number of reported segments, which rose from 3.30 to 3.56 segments. Nichols, 
Street and Cereola (2012) examined a larger sample of 335 companies from the top tier 
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index of 14 European stock exchanges. They found the average number of segments 
reported to increase from 3.84 to 4.0. Overall, 27 % of their sample companies 
increased the number of reported segments, while 11 % decreased it. The researchers 
however noted that the increase in the reported segments was not as notable as it was 
with SFAS No. 131 in the United States, as the majority of the companies reported the 
same amount or even fewer segments. This same finding was reported by the European 
Securities Market Authority (2011), who reported that 74 % of their sample companies 
maintained the number of reported segments. 
 
Also only few changes have occurred in the reported segment line items. In their PIR, 
IASB summarized that on average the number of segment line items has not decreased. 
However, some items are no longer reported, notably for example segment liabilities 
and capital expenditure, and this has raised a concern that material items are no longer 
allocated to segments.  On a positive side, the IASB noted that more companies had 
started to report more than one measure of segment profit. (IASB 2013a.) 
 
Despite these average findings, Crawford, Extance, Helliar and Power (2012) report a 
decrease in the reported line items per segment, from 7.57 to 6.99. However, similarly 
to the IASB’s summary, they reported that the most significant declines were found in 
the reporting of segment liabilities, capital expenditure and total carrying amount of 
assets by location. Also Nichols, Street and Cereola (2012) report an average decrease 
in the reported segment line items, from 8.79 to 8.38. They found the most notable 
declines in the reporting of segment liabilities, equity method income and investment, 
capital expenditures and research and development costs. However, according to the 
IASB’s objectives, their results show a significant increase in the number of companies 
reporting more than one segment profitability measure. These measures include non-
IFRS measures such as operating income, EBIT, EBT, and EBITDA. 
 
According to the primary research the most positive changes have occurred in the 
geographical segment reporting. Crawford, Extance, Helliar and Power (2012) found 
that more location-specific geographic information was reported. Nichols, Street and 
Cereola (2012) also reported an increase in the quality of geographic segment 
disclosures. They found an overall increase in the reported geographic areas from 4.68 
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to 5.35. The percentage of companies reporting geographic segments based on vague 
groupings of countries also dropped from 17 % to 10 %. The researchers argued that 
this more country-specific information should be more relevant to the financial 
statement users.  
 
One of IASB’s goals also already investigated is the consistency of the segment 
reporting information with other parts of the annual report. In this respect the research 
results are mixed, as some report that a great majority of companies report information 
consistent with the management discussion and analysis and the introductory part of the 
annual report (Nichols et al. 2012), but others find that inconsistencies persist even after 
IFRS 8. Crawford, Extance, Helliar and Power (2012) for example reported that for a 
sub-sample they identify a mean number of 4 reported segments by products or 
services, but the annual reports on average refer to 7 different segments by products or 
services. 
 
Overall, it seems IFRS 8 has managed to change companies’ reporting practices so that 
segments are reported in a slightly more disaggregated manner, which should be more 
decision-useful for financial statement users (Crawford et al. 2012). However, the 
results are much less impactful than those found in the United States with the 
introduction of SFAS No. 131. During the PIR the IASB (2013a) has concluded that 
this might be because companies could have already aligned their internal reporting 
with the published segments under IAS 14R. As discussed, the primary research has 
also merely focused on larger companies, and more research is needed to address the 
changes occurred in smaller entities’ reporting (Nichols et al. 2012). Further research is 
also needed to investigate the changes in the analysts’ information environment and 
whether the standard reduced information asymmetry or the cost of capital, to truly 
assess its impact (IASB 2013a).   
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3.3 Other Findings 
 
Overall, during the PIR-process all information collected indicates that segment 
information is important for investors and other financial statement users, but that 
despite some benefits, the application of IFRS 8 has also raised some worries. (IASB 
2013a.) Many different stakeholders, such as analysts, auditors or market authorities, 
have indicated their opinions through the comment letter –process included in the PIR 
or by issuing a direct report to the IASB. 
 
The comment letters reveal that the IASB had correctly anticipated at least one benefit 
in its objectives for IFRS 8, i.e. reducing the cost of providing segment information. 
The commenters have stated that the cost for preparers has decreased due to the 
increased efficiencies in merging internal and external processes and systems. 
Specifically they stated that segment reporting is now less burdensome and that their 
communication with investors has improved. There is also support for the argument that 
management discussion and analysis are now better aligned with the segment 
information, thus increasing the information value for both. (IASB 2013a.) 
 
Some credit has also been given to the possibility to use non-IFRS measures and the 
requirement to disclose only those segment line items that are reported to the CODM. 
Commenters have stated that non-IFRS measures communicate information about 
operating risks and performance, as they exclude transactions that are out of the control 
of the management, such as exchange rates. The financial statement preparers also 
expressed that as the standard only requires reporting those line items that are reported 
to the CODM, segment reporting no longer includes line items that are artificially 
allocated to each segment to comply with the reporting standard. Also investors were 
found to be of the opinion that now the line items represent the key items for monitoring 
the company internally, thus increasing the understanding on how the entity is managed. 
(IASB 2013a.) 
 
  
  32 
In addition to these perceived benefits, some possible disadvantages of the standard 
have also been expressed. From the investors’ point of view, the most addressing 
concerns were stated to be the loss of comparability between companies, loss of 
particular key segment line items and lack of detail. The loss of comparability was 
mainly felt to be due to the use of non-IFRS measures. Specifically the concern was that 
many companies did not provide reconciliations from these measures to IFRS measures. 
(IASB 2013a.) This same concern was shared in a report by the European Securities 
Market Authority (ESMA 2011). Investors also expressed their opinion that they did not 
anymore have enough detailed information for their analytical work, as the disclosure of 
cash flow, segment assets, segment liabilities and capital expenditure had decreased. 
(IASB 2013a.) 
 
For financial statement preparers the main difficulties with the new standard seemed to 
concern the identification of the CODM and segment aggregation criteria (see 
explanations on page 13-14). Aggregation guidance was found to be insufficient, and 
commenters feared that this would lead to the aggregation of dissimilar segments. Many 
commenters felt that the aggregation criteria in the standard is so strict that reporting 
accordingly would result in aggregation being impossible in practice. The commenters 
have also asked for more guidance on what constitutes similar economic characteristics, 
which is used as the aggregation criteria in the standard. (IASB 2013a.) 
 
The ESMA (2011) report further opens these concerns. Firstly, they argued that the 
CODM term itself suggests that the body is involved in making operative decisions, but 
the task of resource allocation suggests that the body also holds a strategic position. For 
instance, 41 % of the companies investigated identified the Board of Directors as the 
CODM in spite of the fact that this body usually includes also non-executive directors. 
As these non-executive directors are not involved in operative decisions it would 
suggest that allocating resources and assessing segment performance are not always 
carried out by the same body or by using the same information. When the Board of 
Directors is identified as the CODM, ESMA expressed fears that it would lead to a less 
detailed level of segment information, and it also appeared that the judgment used to 
identify the CODM had resulted in a reduction of reportable segments.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 33 
Secondly, regarding the segment aggregation criteria of the standard ESMA reports that 
it is not always clear which factors have been considered in determining whether two 
segments have similar economic characteristics or not. In addition, the majority of their 
sample companies had not disclosed the fact whether segments had been aggregated. 
ESMA feared that this lack of disclosure would have led to companies reporting 
segments at a lower level than they do internally to their management, thus indicating 
non-compliance with the standard. ESMA stated that there exists a level of subjectivity 
in the standard’s aggregation criteria, which therefore tempts companies to aggregate 
segments that should be reported individually, and thus would provide another 
explanation to the rather low increases in the number of reported segments. (ESMA 
2011.) 
 
From the comments of auditors the main concern that has risen to attention was the 
increased tension with their clients on agreeing which segments to report. Auditors 
reported that companies are concerned about the commercial sensitivity of the 
information they are obliged to release. This was found to be particularly true for 
jurisdictions with smaller capital markets, which have a lot of family-run businesses and 
in general smaller entities. There were arguments that IFRS 8 is unfair to those 
companies which compete in markets where their competition are much larger entities 
which can aggregate their commercially sensitive information to other segments.  
(IASB 2013a.) 
 
As a summary, it can be stated that IFRS 8 has seemed to accomplish some of its goals, 
such as the ones that some companies would increase the amount of segments reported 
and that the cost for segment reporting would decrease. However, also some concerns 
expressed by the critics upon the standard’s release have materialized, such as the loss 
of comparability between companies and the suggestion that the standard puts smaller 
companies in a tougher position. Therefore, it is easy to drive the same conclusion as 
the IASB (2013a), that further information on the effect of IFRS 8 is still needed. 
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4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1 Hypotheses 
 
The aim of this study is to assess the changes occurred in segment reporting in Finland 
after the adoption of IFRS 8, and whether there are indications of increased segment 
reporting quality due to the adoption of the management approach. To measure the 
reporting changes, the study uses the number of segments and the number of segment 
line items, and the quality respect is investigated with segment disaggregation and 
cross-segment transfer measures.  
 
As discussed earlier, the increase in the number of reported segments was one of the 
most notable effects that the introduction of management approach had to segment 
reporting in the USA (e.g. Berger & Hann 2003, Hermann & Thomas 2000, Street & 
Nichols 2000). This increase was also a major goal set by the IASB when the new 
standard was issued (IASB 2006a). Primary research results on the effect of IFRS 8 also 
support the increase in the number of reported segments (Nichols et al. 2012, Crawford 
et al. 2012), and therefore the first hypothesis is stated as follows: 
 
H1a. The number of reported segments increases after the adoption of IFRS 8. 
H1b. The number of companies reporting only a single segment decreases after 
the adoption of IFRS 8. 
 
Another way to measure the changes in segment reporting is through the line items 
reported per each segment. In their research Nichols, Street and Cereola (2012) found 
that with IFRS 8 the amount of reported line items decreased, as the average items 
reported dropped from 8.79 items to 8.38 items. The same result was documented by 
Crawford, Extance, Helliar and Power (2012), who found a decrease from 7.57 items to 
6.99 items. Some criticism had been placed on the fact that IFRS 8 does not specifically 
require for any other item disclosure than the segment profitability. Therefore the critics 
expected that the number of items reported would decrease. (Nichols et al. 2012.) 
However, regarding the IASB’s hope that companies would report new measures of 
segment performance the primary research finds support for. Nichols, Street and 
 
 
 
 
 35 
Cereola (2012) reported an increase in the number of companies reporting more than 
one measure of segment profitability. In light of these results, the next hypothesis is the 
following: 
 
H2a. The number of items disclosed for each segment decreases after the adoption 
of IFRS 8. 
H2b. The number of companies reporting more than one measure of segment 
profitability increases after the adoption of IFRS 8.  
 
To compare two reporting practices with the number of reported segments and segment 
line items only would be a rather crude quality measurement of segment reporting 
(Berger & Hann 2003). Therefore, the investigation is extended with measures of the 
level of reported segment disaggregation and cross-segment transfers. Earlier research 
states that the usefulness of segment reporting increases with segment disaggregation 
(e.g. Nichols & Street 2007). In the same manner, high quality segment reporting 
reveals information about the resource transfers across the reported segments (Berger & 
Hann 2007). As this is the case, for IFRS 8 to have been effective in improving the 
quality of segment reporting, both of these characteristics should have been improved. 
Berger and Hann (2003) found support that SFAS No. 131 increased segment 
disaggregation and that it conveyed more information about cross-segment transfers, 
and thus the next hypothesis is stated as follows: 
 
H3a. The segment disaggregation measures show an increased level of 
disaggregation after the adoption of IFRS 8. 
H3b. The cross-segment transfer measures show an increased amount of 
information after the adoption of IFRS 8. 
 
The next issue investigated in the study concerns the possible early adoption effect. 
IFRS 8 became mandatory from the financial year 2009 onwards, but it offered a 
possibility for companies to start utilizing it even before this date (IASB 2006b). Earlier 
research has not covered whether the early adopters reacted differently to the standard 
change than the ones that adopted it when it became mandatory. However, there is 
evidence that companies behave strategically in deciding what they disclose to their 
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segment reporting footnote (Hayes & Lundholm 1996, Bens et al. 2011). As such, it is 
reasonable to expect that companies chose to early adopt IFRS 8 because they knew 
they had to make changes to their reporting sooner or later, and decided to do it sooner. 
In this respect, the next hypothesis is the following: 
 
H4. The early adopters made more changes to their segment reporting after 
adopting IFRS 8 than the regular adopters. 
 
The final question this study aims to address is whether the company size had a 
significant effect on the changes that companies made to their segment reporting. 
Earlier research suggests that larger and more complex companies have higher quality 
reporting (e.g. Lang & Lundholm 1993, Aitken et al. 1997, Ettredge et al. 2005). Claims 
have also been made that smaller companies might be more negatively affected if they 
would release highly disaggregated segment information, as their larger competitors 
would take the benefit of it (Crawford et al. 2012). Also, it has been found that larger 
companies have more capital market incentives to disclose more segment information 
(Ettredge et al. 2006). Therefore, the expectation is that smaller companies will show 
smaller improvements in the segment reporting quality measures investigated, and the 
final hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H5. The probability of increased segment reporting quality after the adoption of 
IFRS 8 increases with company size. 
4.2 Sample Selection and Data 
 
My initial sample consists of all publicly listed companies in Helsinki OMX Stock 
Exchange. As such, the primary sample consists of a total of 122 companies. However, 
to be fit for the research the companies have had to apply both IAS 14R and IFRS 8 
standards in their financial statements. Therefore, 7 companies from the initial sample 
were excluded either because they were listed after the year 2008, or because they early 
adopted IFRS 8 on their IPO year and therefore never applied the old standard IAS 14R. 
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Secondly, companies operating in the banking industry were also deleted from the 
initial sample. This is a common practice in segment reporting research (e.g. Prather-
Kinsey & Meek 2004, Street et al. 2000), because banks have additional reporting 
requirements besides the IFRS, which might affect their segment reporting and 
therefore bias the results. In total, 3 companies were deleted from the sample in this 
phase.  
 
After these eliminations I moved forward to data gathering phase. As segment reporting 
is very sensitive to changes in the company structure, such as acquisitions or 
divestitures, to properly investigate the effect the standard change had on the sample 
companies’ reporting, these real changes need to be controlled for. Following Berger 
and Hann (2003), this problem is solved through hand-collecting restated 2008 segment 
data from the 2009 annual reports. Thus, the original 2008 data reported under IAS 14R 
will be compared to the restated 2008 data reported under IFRS 8, and the companies’ 
segment reporting will be compared for the same financial year. The annual reports for 
the companies were collected from their websites. 
 
Unlike IAS 14R, which required all companies to report segments based on both line-
of-business (LOB) and geographic areas, under the management approach of IFRS 8 
segments are reported under one classification only and in theory it is possible to 
organize segments in numerous different ways. However, studies have shown that most 
companies report their segments using the LOB classification. For example, Nichols, 
Street and Cereola (2012) reported that 75 % of their sample reports LOB segments, 
while only 19 % defined segments geographically when IFRS 8 was applied.   
 
Therefore, to properly investigate the changes in segment reporting practices, focus on 
either LOB or geographic segments needs to be chosen (Berger & Hann 2003). As the 
majority of companies use the LOB (industry) classification, this study focuses on the 
changes in the line-of-business reporting. Following Berger and Hann (2003), sample 
companies that report only geographic segments under IFRS 8 will be regarded as 
single-segment LOB companies. However, additional tests will be executed where 
companies reporting only geographic segments under IFRS 8 are eliminated from the 
sample.  
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For companies reporting mixed segments, i.e. both geographic and LOB segments, all 
geographic segments belonging to the same LOB are aggregated to one segment. To 
illustrate this aggregation mechanism, see an example of Talentum’s segment reporting 
under IFRS 8 below in table 3. 
 
Segment Name Sales Segment Name Sales
Publishing Finland € 53,10 Publishing € 87,50
Publishing Sweden € 34,40 -
Direct Marketing € 5,60 Direct Marketing € 5,60
Other € 0,20 Other € 0,20
Original Data (NSEG = 4) Aggregated Data (NSEG = 3)
TABLE 3.
Segment Aggregation Mechanism
 
 
To further ensure that the restated segment data used only reflects the reporting changes 
due to the standard effect, all those observations are eliminated for which the restated 
data demonstrates contamination due to for example discontinued operations or changes 
in used accounting methods. To check for this contamination, I use an algorithm 
developed by Berger and Hann (2003), which compares the sum of segment revenues 
between the two reporting practices. When historical IAS 14R segment revenues differ 
from the restated IFRS 8 segment revenues by more than 1 %, the company in question 
is taken under further investigation to check whether the financial statements give 
implications on acquisitions, divestments or changes in accounting practices, which 
might contaminate the data. 
 
The initial sample included 19 companies, for which the contamination algorithm 
exceeded the allowed amount. For these 19 companies the financial statements for both 
years under examined were taken under investigation. As a result, 2 companies were 
excluded from the final sample due to divestments made during one of the investigation 
years, which had an effect on the segment reporting data. After these three stages of 
eliminations, the final sample includes a total of 110 companies, and 220 year-
observations, respectively.  
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This final sample also includes 8 companies that used the option to adopt IFRS 8 early. 
For these companies, data from the last year of IAS 14R adoption is compared to the 
first year of IFRS 8 adoption in the same manner as discussed before. All results will be 
presented for the whole sample, the early adopters and regular adopters alone, and the 
investigation on H4 covers whether the early adopters reacted differently to the standard 
change when compared to the regular adopters.  
 
Table 4 summarizes the eliminations done to the initial sample. The list of companies 
included in the sample and the reason for their possible elimination can also be found in 
Appendix A. It also indicates the 8 early adopters included in the final sample. 
 
TABLE 4. 
Breakdown of the Sample Selection 
   No of firms 
Public firms listed in Helsinki OMX Stock Exchange 122 
- Have always applied IFRS 8 -7 
- Banks -3 
- Contamination of data due to divestments -2 
Final sample 110 
  
4.3 Empirical Tests 
 
4.3.1 Segment Reporting Quality 
 
To test whether the impact of IFRS 8 to the sample companies’ segment reporting was 
significant, the results under IAS 14R and IFRS 8 have to be compared with either a 
parametric t-test or a non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-ranks test. Therefore, before 
conducting any tests on the variables explained below, they will first be analyzed with 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk normality tests. If the tests results indicate that 
the variables are normally distributed, a t-test will be used. If the results show the 
opposite, a non-parametric test will be utilized.  
 
 
  40 
Regarding hypotheses H1 and H2, one of the tests mentioned above will be executed to 
measure whether the increases/decreases in reported segment information are 
statistically significant, according to the normality test results. The descriptive statistics 
aim to highlight the number of companies reporting a certain number of segments under 
both reporting regimes, and also give information on what was the change in the 
number of reported segments and segment line items. The variables in use are the 
following:  
 
 NSEG  =  the number of segments 
 ∆NSEG   = the change in the number of segments 
 NSLI    = the number of segment line items 
 ∆NSLI  =  the change in the number of segment line items 
 
Following the investigation of these descriptive statistics, I will use Berger and Hann’s 
(2003) disaggregation and cross-segment transfer measures to examine more thoroughly 
the quality effect of IFRS 8. Specifically, the issues investigated are the changes in the 
level of segment disaggregation, i.e. the number of segments reported compared to how 
many segments the companies should report, and changes in the level of information 
conveyed about intra-segment transfers. The two measures to investigate H3a are the 
following: 
 
         DISAGG    =   the natural log of 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠,  
where the no of business activities is measured as the no of 
different two-digit SIC codes the firm operates in during the 
segment report year 
 HERF  =  the Herfindal index based on revenues, calculated as: 
∑ 𝑆𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1
�∑ 𝑆𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 �
2,  
where n = no of segments, and Si = segment i’s sales 
 
( 1 ) 
( 2 ) 
 
 
 
 
 41 
DISAGG demonstrates the number of reported segments in relation to the number of 
business activities the company is engaged in. The higher the value of DISAGG, the 
higher is the level of segment disaggregation. Instead, HERF is a revenue-based 
Herfindahl index, which besides taking into account the number of segments reported 
also captures the size of the reported segments. Companies that report only a single 
segment receive HERF value of 1, and the lower the value of HERF, the higher is the 
reported level of diversification across segments. (Berger & Hann 2003.) The 
significance of the difference between IAS 14R and IFRS 8 results will again be tested 
with a t-test or a non-parametric test. 
 
The cross-segment transfer measures also include two measures developed by Berger 
and Hann (2003): 
 
 NLSEG  = the no of segments with losses 
 TRANSFER = Max�𝑆𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋−𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 , 0� x 100, 
     where: 
     Excess CAPX  = Max [𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋 − (𝑂𝑃𝑆 + 𝐷𝐸𝑃), 0]  
     CAPX  = capital expenditure 
     OPS   = operating profits 
     DEP   = depreciation expense 
 
NLSEG demonstrates the number of loss segments. It can be used to capture cross-
segment transfers, because in a diversified company segments that are making losses 
can survive for longer, as they can be subsidized by other segments and they do not 
necessarily have to fund their own losses. The higher the value of NLSEG, the more 
information is conveyed about intra-segment transfers. (Berger & Hann 2003.) 
 
TRANSFER on the other hand is based on the idea that if a segment’s own free cash 
flow is not enough for its investments, some of its investment expenses are covered by 
the other segments, excess operating cash flow from prior years and external capital. 
The measure uses capital expenditure as a proxy for investment expense and operating 
profit and depreciation as a proxy for free cash flow. The firm level excess capital 
( 3 ) 
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expenditure in the model controls for the possibility to fund a segment’s investments 
with prior year cash flows and external financing. Thus, when the nominator of the 
equation is positive, segments have received transfers of funds from the other segments. 
The higher the value of TRANSFER, the more information again is conveyed about 
cross-segment transfers. (Berger & Hann 2003.) The significance of the difference 
between IAS 14 and IFRS 8 results will at the end be tested with a t-test or a non-
parametric Wilcoxon signed-ranks-test. 
 
As IFRS 8 does not explicitly require for any other item disclosure than the segment 
profit, it is possible that not all sample companies report information needed for the 
calculation of HERF and TRANSFER variables. These companies will therefore be 
excluded from the investigation of these measures. Regarding the TRANSFER variable, 
I will follow Berger and Hann (2003), who assumed the level of segment depreciation 
as zero when segment depreciation data was not reported. The researchers argued that it 
was likely that in these cases the amount of segment depreciation was insignificant. 
Therefore, all companies reporting capital expenditure per segment are eligible for the 
investigation of the TRANSFER variable. However, a sensitivity test will be executed 
which excludes those companies that did not report segment depreciation data. 
 
4.3.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
As discussed earlier, under IAS 14R companies reported both LOB and geographic 
segments. Under IFRS 8 however, companies report segments only in one way. 
Therefore, when a company chooses to report geographic segments under IFRS 8, the 
previously existing LOB information disappears, therefore decreasing the amount of 
segment information. As explained, this is why the companies reporting only 
geographic segments are considered to be single-segment LOB companies in this study. 
This first part of the tests regarding variables NSEG, DISAGG, HERF, NLSEG and 
TRANSFER therefore captures the overall information loss or gain on LOB segments. 
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As a second part, these variables will be investigated with only those companies that 
continued to report LOB segments under IFRS 8. This is done to capture the reporting 
changes of LOB-reporting companies, thus revealing the magnitude of the change for 
LOB segments from IAS 14R to IFRS 8.  
 
4.3.3 The Early Adoption Effect 
 
As discussed, regarding the tests for all the hypotheses explained above, results will be 
presented for the whole sample, and also individually for the early adopter and the 
regular adopter sample.  To test the validity of hypothesis H4, an independent samples 
t-test or a non-parametric Mann-Whitney-U test will be executed according to the 
normality test results. This tests the significance of the difference between the occurred 
reporting changes for the two groups. 
 
4.3.4 The Size Effect 
 
To examine whether size has affected the changes occurred in the segment reporting 
practices, Pearson or Spearman rank correlations between size measures and the above 
explained segment reporting quality measures will be calculated. If the normality tests 
on the variables indicate that the variables are normally distributed, Pearson rank 
correlation will be executed, and vice versa.  
 
To limit the estimation error related to the chosen measure of company size, a number 
of different size measures will be applied, including total assets, total sales, and market 
capitalization. These measures were chosen because of their wide usage in previous 
literature. For example Lang and Lundholm (1993) use market capitalization as a proxy 
for company size, whereas Harris (1998) and Ettredge, Kwon, Smith and Zarowin 
(2005) use total sales. Nichols and Street (2007) and Aitken, Hooper and Pickering 
(1997) on the other hand provide examples of the use of total assets as a size proxy. 
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As discussed previously, reporting quality should be increasing with company size (e.g 
Lang & Lundholm 1993, Aitken et al. 1997, Ettredge et al. 2005). As such, the 
correlations between the size measures and the segment reporting measures should be 
positive, except for the HERF variable, where a smaller value indicates higher-quality 
reporting. However, the most interesting part of the investigation is, whether the 
variables measuring the reporting change between the two reporting practices also 
indicate that larger companies have improved their segment reporting quality more than 
smaller ones. Also in this case the correlation coefficients should be positive for all 
other change variables except for ∆HERF. Table 5 summarizes the expected signs of the 
correlation coefficients between the specific variables.  
 
 
Market Value Total Assets Total Sales
IAS 14R
NSEG + + +
NSLI + + +
DISAGG + + +
HERF - - -
NLSEG + + +
TRANSFER + + +
IFRS 8
NSEG + + +
NSLI + + +
DISAGG + + +
HERF - - -
NLSEG + + +
TRANSFER + + +
  NSEG + + +
  NSLI + + +
  DISAGG + + +
  HERF - - -
  NLSEG + + +
  TRANSFER + + +
TABLE 5.
Expected Signs of the Correlations Coefficients
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5 RESULTS 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics on the Impact of IFRS 8  
 
Distribution of Single Segment and Multisegment Firms Under IAS 14 and IFRS 8
Panel A: Whole sample
Single Segment Multisegment Total No. of Obs
IAS 14R
Single Segment 32 3 35
(91.43%) (8.57%) (100%)
88.89% 4.05% 31.82%
Multisegment 4 71 75
(5.33%) (94.67%) (100%)
11.11% 95.95% 68.18%
Total No. of Obs 36 74 110
(32.73%) (67.27%)
100 % 100 %
Panel B: Early adopters
Single Segment Multisegment Total No. of Obs
IAS 14R
Single Segment 0 0 0
(0%) (0%) (0%)
0 % 0 % 0 %
Multisegment 0 8 8
(0%) (100%) (100%)
0 % 100% 100%
Total No. of Obs 0 8 8
(0%) (100%)
0 % 100%
TABLE 6.
IFRS 8
IFRS 8
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This first set of analyses presents descriptive evidence on the effects that IFRS 8 had on 
the sample companies’ segment disclosures, particularly the number of segments 
reported. Table 6 provides the number of companies reporting single or multiple 
segments under both IAS 14R and IFRS 8. The table is divided into two panels, panel A 
representing the whole sample and panel B the early adopters. 
 
As seen from the table, the standard change to IFRS 8 did not increase the number of 
multisegment companies in Finland, and the effect of the standard seems very mild as 
only 7 companies in total changed from one group to the other. This result is 
unexpected based on the results obtained in the United States with SFAS No. 131, and 
also on first results on the effect of IFRS 8 in for example the U.K. or among the largest 
European companies (Crawford et al. 2012, Nichols et al. 2012). Therefore, the 
hypothesis H1b is not supported.  
 
In fact, the number of multisegment companies decreases by one in total, and 
alarmingly, 4 companies that report multiple segments under IAS 14R actually turn into 
single LOB-segment companies under IFRS 8. For the majority of the sample however 
it seems that the standard change did not result in any changes. This is also a very much 
contrary result compared to the huge change in the United States, where the new 
management approach was found to have affected a large number of companies (Berger 
& Hann 2003, Hermann & Thomas 2000).   
 
Table 7 further breaks down the change in the number of reported segments. Panel A 
presents the distribution of the number of reported segments for the investigation year, 
and panel B shows the distribution of the magnitude of the reporting change among the 
companies. Again, it is clear that few companies have changed their reporting, as the 
number of companies reporting a specific number of segments has remained fairly 
constant. The only notable increase is in the amount of companies reporting 3 segments, 
which rises from 21 to 27, due to decreases in the amount of companies reporting 2 or 4 
segments.
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Panel A: Number of reported segments: IAS 14R vs. IFRS 8
No. of 
Segments
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency
Cumulative 
Percent
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency
Cumulative 
Percent
1 35 31,8 % 35 31,8 % 36 32,7 % 36 32,7 %
2 26 23,6 % 61 55,5 % 22 20,0 % 58 52,7 %
3 21 19,1 % 82 74,5 % 27 24,5 % 85 77,3 %
4 14 12,7 % 96 87,3 % 11 10,0 % 96 87,3 %
5 8 7,3 % 104 94,5 % 8 7,3 % 104 94,5 %
6 4 3,6 % 108 98,2 % 3 2,7 % 107 97,3 %
7 2 1,8 % 110 100,0 % 2 1,8 % 109 99,1 %
-/- - - - - - - - -
14 0 0,0 % 110 100,0 % 1 0,9 % 110 100,0 %
Panel B: Reporting changes
Change in the 
No. of 
Segments
Frequency Percent
Cumulative 
Frequency
Cumulative 
Percent Frequency Percent
Cumulative 
Frequency
Cumulative 
Percent
-5 1 0,9 % 1 0,9 % 0 0,0 % 0 0,0 %
-4 0 0,0 % 1 0,9 % 0 0,0 % 0 0,0 %
-3 2 1,8 % 3 2,7 % 1 12,5 % 1 12,5 %
-2 1 0,9 % 4 3,6 % 0 0,0 % 1 12,5 %
-1 14 12,7 % 18 16,4 % 1 12,5 % 2 25,0 %
0 73 66,4 % 91 82,7 % 0 0,0 % 2 25,0 %
1 11 10,0 % 102 92,7 % 3 37,5 % 5 62,5 %
2 6 5,5 % 108 98,2 % 3 37,5 % 8 100,0 %
3 1 0,9 % 109 99,1 % 0 0,0 % 8 100,0 %
-/- - - - - - - - -
8 1 0,9 % 110 100,0 % 0 0,0 % 8 100,0 %
TABLE 7.
Number of Reported Segments and Reporting Change in the Number of Segments
IAS 14R IFRS 8
Whole sample Early adopters
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Panel B further supports this conclusion. In a great majority of 66 % of the sample no 
reporting changes in the number of segments occurred, which means that only one third 
made changes to their reporting. A little more than 16 % (18 companies) of the sample 
reduced the number of segments reported, whereas 17 % (19 companies) increased the 
number of segments. Mostly the changes are of one segment to one direction or the 
other, but there are two outliers, as one sample company, Tieto, reduced the number of 
segments reported by five and another one, Panostaja Group, increased it by eight. 
 
Nevertheless, panel B provides the first insight on that the group of early adopters in the 
sample differs from the group of companies that adopted IFRS 8 when it became 
mandatory. For this group, IFRS 8 resulted in changes for all of the sample companies, 
25 % (2 companies) of them decreasing the number of segments and 75 % (6 
companies) increasing it. These results can be considered similar to earlier research on 
IFRS 8, which showed an average increase in the amount of segments reported 
(Crawford et al. 2012, Nichols et al. 2012). Also, the results indicate that there might be 
differences in the way IFRS 8 affected the reporting of early adopters when compared 
to the regular adopters. 
 
The next set of analyses provides similar information as presented above on the number 
of segments on the changes that occurred in the number of segment line items reported. 
Table 8, panel A presents the number of companies reporting a specific number of 
segment line items under both reporting regimes. Panel B presents the distribution of 
the magnitude of the reporting change. The single segment companies are included, and 
can be seen on the first row of panel A. 
 
These results again confirm that IFRS 8 did not encourage companies to make 
significant changes to their reporting. The distribution of the number of segment line 
items reported stays fairly similar, only shifting somewhat downwards in the beginning, 
as more companies are reporting fewer items per segment. For instance, under IAS 14R 
40 % (44 companies) of the sample report 5 items or less, whereas the corresponding 
figure is 48 % (53 companies) for IFRS 8.  
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Panel A: Number of reported segment line items: IAS 14R vs. IFRS 8
No. of Line 
Items
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency
Cumulative 
Percent
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency
Cumulative 
Percent
0 35 31,8 % 35 31,8 % 36 32,7 % 36 32,7 %
1 0 0,0 % 35 31,8 % 4 3,6 % 40 36,4 %
2 1 0,9 % 36 32,7 % 0 0,0 % 40 36,4 %
3 8 7,3 % 44 40,0 % 3 2,7 % 43 39,1 %
4 0 0,0 % 44 40,0 % 2 1,8 % 45 40,9 %
5 0 0,0 % 44 40,0 % 8 7,3 % 53 48,2 %
6 9 8,2 % 53 48,2 % 4 3,6 % 57 51,8 %
7 7 6,4 % 60 54,5 % 7 6,4 % 64 58,2 %
8 10 9,1 % 70 63,6 % 6 5,5 % 70 63,6 %
9 11 10,0 % 81 73,6 % 10 9,1 % 80 72,7 %
10 5 4,5 % 86 78,2 % 7 6,4 % 87 79,1 %
11 9 8,2 % 95 86,4 % 8 7,3 % 95 86,4 %
12 6 5,5 % 101 91,8 % 3 2,7 % 98 89,1 %
13 2 1,8 % 103 93,6 % 2 1,8 % 100 90,9 %
14 2 1,8 % 105 95,5 % 2 1,8 % 102 92,7 %
15 1 0,9 % 106 96,4 % 3 2,7 % 105 95,5 %
16 0 0,0 % 106 96,4 % 0 0,0 % 105 95,5 %
17 1 0,9 % 107 97,3 % 1 0,9 % 106 96,4 %
18 0 0,0 % 107 97,3 % 0 0,0 % 106 96,4 %
19 2 1,8 % 109 99,1 % 2 1,8 % 108 98,2 %
20 0 0,0 % 109 99,1 % 0 0,0 % 108 98,2 %
21 1 0,9 % 110 100,0 % 2 1,8 % 110 100,0 %
TABLE 8.
Number of Reported Segment Line Items and Reporting Change in the Number of Line Items
IAS 14R IFRS 8
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Panel B: Reporting changes
Change in the 
No. of Line 
Items
Frequency Percent
Cumulative 
Frequency
Cumulative 
Percent Frequency Percent
Cumulative 
Frequency
Cumulative 
Percent
-9 1 0,9 % 1 0,9 % 0 0,0 % 0 0,0 %
-8 1 0,9 % 2 1,8 % 0 0,0 % 0 0,0 %
-7 1 0,9 % 3 2,7 % 0 0,0 % 0 0,0 %
-6 0 0,0 % 3 2,7 % 0 0,0 % 0 0,0 %
-5 0 0,0 % 3 2,7 % 0 0,0 % 0 0,0 %
-4 3 2,7 % 6 5,5 % 0 0,0 % 0 0,0 %
-3 3 2,7 % 9 8,2 % 0 0,0 % 0 0,0 %
-2 9 8,2 % 18 16,4 % 1 12,5 % 1 12,5 %
-1 7 6,4 % 25 22,7 % 0 0,0 % 1 12,5 %
0 65 59,1 % 90 81,8 % 3 37,5 % 4 50,0 %
1 9 8,2 % 99 90,0 % 1 12,5 % 5 62,5 %
2 2 1,8 % 101 91,8 % 0 0,0 % 5 62,5 %
3 4 3,6 % 105 95,5 % 1 12,5 % 6 75,0 %
4 1 0,9 % 106 96,4 % 1 12,5 % 7 87,5 %
5 2 1,8 % 108 98,2 % 0 0,0 % 7 87,5 %
6 0 0,0 % 108 98,2 % 0 0,0 % 7 87,5 %
7 0 0,0 % 108 98,2 % 0 0,0 % 7 87,5 %
8 0 0,0 % 108 98,2 % 0 0,0 % 7 87,5 %
9 1 0,9 % 109 99,1 % 1 12,5 % 8 100,0 %
10 1 0,9 % 110 100,0 % 0 0,0 % 8 100,0 %
TABLE 8.
Number of Reported Segment Line Items and Reporting Change in the Number of Line Items
Whole sample Early adopters
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Panel B provides similar evidence, confirming that for most companies (59 %) the 
amount of segment line items reported remains constant, and that there are slightly more 
companies decreasing (23 %, 25 companies) the number of items than there are 
companies increasing it (18 %, 20 companies). Contrary to the changes occurred in the 
number of reported segments, not all early adopters have changed the number of 
segment line items reported. However, in their case the majority of the non-zero-change 
sample increase the amount of line items reported, contrary to the regular adopters, as 
only 12,5 % (1 company) decrease the amount reported and 50 % (4 companies) 
increase it. This again indicates a difference in the way the early adopters and regular 
adopters reacted to the new standard. 
 
Table 9 provides more detailed information on specific line items reported by the 
multisegment companies included in the sample. The items are organized in the table 
according to the disclosure requirements of IFRS 8. The bracketed IAS 14R indicates 
that the item in question was specifically required to be disclosed when reporting LOB 
segments as a primary segment. If LOB segments were reported as a secondary 
segments, IAS 14R required the disclosure of segment sales, assets and capital 
expenditure, so in theory only these items must have a 100 % disclosure level under IAS 
14R. For IFRS 8, this is true for the profitability measure. 
 
As can be seen from the table, the only item that reaches the 100 % disclosure level is 
the segment sales, and this is true for both standards. Under IAS 14R, also segment 
assets, segment liabilities, segment profitability measure, depreciation and capital 
expenditure reach over 80 % disclosure levels. As expected, sales, segment assets and 
capital expenditure have the highest disclosure levels, but not all companies have 
fulfilled the requirements of IAS 14R, as the disclosure levels of capital expenditure and 
segment assets do not reach 100 %. Under IFRS 8 only segment assets, profitability 
measure and depreciation reach the 80 % disclosure level, indicating a decrease in the 
level of items disclosed, as predicted by hypothesis H2a. In a similar manner, the results 
on IFRS 8 indicate non-compliance with the standard, as only 92 % of the sample 
include the segment profitability measure in their reporting.
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Item disclosed
No. of Firms 
Disclosing
Percentage of Firms 
n  = 75a
No. of Firms 
Disclosing
Percentage of Firms 
n  = 74b
Items required by IAS 14R and IFRS 8
Profitability measure 67 89,3 % 68 91,9 %
Profit/loss items required by IFRS 8 if certain conditions met c
Revenue from external customers (IAS 14R ) 75 100,0 % 74 100,0 %
Revenue from other segments (IAS 14R ) 47 62,7 % 48 64,9 %
Interest revenue 0 0,0 % 2 2,7 %
Interest expense 4 5,3 % 6 8,1 %
Depreciation/Amortization (IAS 14R ) 62 82,7 % 63 85,1 %
Equity method income (IAS 14R ) 28 37,3 % 23 31,1 %
Income tax expense/benefit 1 1,3 % 1 1,4 %
Other significant non-cash expenses (e.g. impairment) (IAS 14R ) 30 40,0 % 27 36,5 %
Balance sheet information required by IFRS 8 if certain conditions met d
Segment assets (IAS 14R ) 74 98,7 % 65 87,8 %
Segment liabilities (IAS 14R ) 64 85,3 % 53 71,6 %
Equity method investment (IAS 14R ) 29 38,7 % 30 40,5 %
Capital expenditure (IAS 14R ) 71 94,7 % 59 79,7 %
Voluntary disclosures
Additional income statement detail 6 8,0 % 6 8,1 %
Additional balance sheet detail 11 14,7 % 9 12,2 %
Cash flow information 4 5,3 % 5 6,8 %
Non-recurring items 8 10,7 % 12 16,2 %
Goodwill 7 9,3 % 7 9,5 %
Employees 19 25,3 % 19 25,7 %
Orders/Order book 3 4,0 % 5 6,8 %
Others e 15 20,0 % 20 27,0 %
a  110 - 35 single segment IAS 14R firms.
b  110 - 36 single segment IFRS 8 firms.
e Including capital employed, various profitability ratios, operating margin, working capital.
d  Balance sheet information is required under IFRS 8 if it is included in the measure of segment assets reviewed by chief operating decision maker, or otherwise regularly provided to the 
chief operating decision maker, even if not included in that measure of segment assets.
TABLE 9.
Number of Multisegment Firms Disclosing Specific Segment Line Items
IAS 14R IFRS 8
c  Profit/loss information is required under IFRS 8 if it is included in the profitability measure reviewed by chief operating decision maker, or otherwise regularly provided to the chief 
operating decision maker, even if not included in that profitability measure.
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In general, the disclosure levels of the line items stay fairly constant. However, there are 
some notable changes. As expected by the hypothesis H2a, it does not seem that IFRS 8 
increased the willingness to disclose more segment line items. In fact, the only items 
that post increased disclosure by more than one company are interest revenue and 
expense, non-recurring items, orders/order book and other items, which include for 
instance profitability ratios such as return on assets or the amount of working capital per 
segment. From these items the increases in the disclosure of interest revenue and 
expense are logical, because they are mentioned by IFRS 8 as possible items to disclose 
but were not required by IAS 14R. In none of the items however the increase exceeds 5 
companies. 
 
When looked at the other side of the story, the news are more alarming. There are in 
total 6 items, for which the disclosure level dropped by more than one company, 
including equity method income, non-cash-expenses, additional balance sheet detail, 
segment assets, segment liabilities and capital expenditure. In addition, the decreases in 
the last three line items mentioned are of a different magnitude than any of the increases 
mentioned earlier. The disclosure level of segment assets drops from almost 99 % (74 
companies) to lower than 88 % (65 companies). The corresponding figures are even 
larger for segment liabilities, for which the disclosure level decreases from 85 % (64 
companies) to only 71 % (53 companies). The biggest drop is experienced in the 
disclosure level of capital expenditure, which decreases by 12 companies, from 95 % to 
a little below 80 %. These results are similar to the ones that were documented by 
Nichols, Street and Cereola (2012).  
 
Table 10 presents more detailed data on the different profitability measures disclosed 
for the reported segments, and thus provides information concerning hypothesis H2b. 
Panel A provides information on the level of disclosure of the different measures, and 
panel B compares the amount of companies reporting more than one profitability 
measure per segment under the two reporting regimes. The most frequently reported 
profitability measure is the operating profit, for which the disclosure level is around 
90 % under both IAS 14R and IFRS 8.  
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Panel A: Number of reported segment profitability measures
No. of Firms 
Disclosing
Percentage of Firms 
n  = 75a
No. of Firms 
Disclosing
Percentage of Firms 
n  = 74b
Operating profit 67 89,3 % 68 91,9 %
Net income 5 6,7 % 4 5,4 %
Comparable operating profit 0 0,0 % 1 1,4 %
EBITDA 0 0,0 % 3 4,1 %
EBITA 3 4,0 % 3 4,1 %
EBT 0 0,0 % 1 1,4 %
Panel B: Number of firms reporting multiple segment profitability measures
No. of Firms 
Disclosing
Percentage of Firms 
n  = 75a
No. of Firms 
Disclosing
Percentage of Firms 
n  = 74b
None 8 10,7 % 6 8,1 %
1 profitability measure 57 76,0 % 56 75,7 %
2 profitability measures 10 13,3 % 12 16,2 %
TABLE 10.
Disclosure of Segment Profitability Measure
IAS 14R IFRS 8
IAS 14R IFRS 8
 
 
 
Contrary to the expectations of hypothesis H2b, and the results documented by Nichols, 
Street and Cereola (2012), it does not seem that IFRS 8 encouraged Finnish companies 
to disclose more than one profitability item per segment. There is a slight increase in the 
number of companies reporting for example EBITDA (earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortization), and the number of companies disclosing 2 profitability 
measures rises by two. These results are however mild compared to the previous ones, 
where the amount of companies disclosing multiple profitability measures rose from 
18 % to 25 % (Nichols et al. 2012). All in all, according to the descriptive statistics 
IFRS 8 did not have a material impact on the segment reporting of Finnish listed 
companies. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 55 
5.2 Univariate Analysis on the Impact of IFRS 8  
 
The second set of analyses provides the results concerning the validity of hypotheses 
from H1 to H3. Before executing any of the tests, all the test variables were tested for 
normality using the Kolmogorov-Smirnova and Shapiro-Wilk tests. The test results 
showed that none of the variables followed the normal plot, therefore indicating that 
non-parametric tests should be used when evaluating the significance of the segment 
reporting change. Exact results of the tests can be found in Appendix B. 
 
Table 11 presents the first set of univariate analyses, showing results for hypotheses H1 
and H3. Panel A contains the results for the whole sample; panel B for the early 
adopters and panel C only includes the regular adopters. As expected by the descriptive 
results, the differences between the reporting under IAS 14R and IFRS 8 are not great. 
Under IAS 14R Finnish companies reported on average 2.58 segments, and this rose a 
little to 2.65 on average under IFRS 8. A non-parametric z-test reveals this is not 
statistically significant, thus rejecting H1a. This result is contrary to the results obtained 
by Nichols, Street and Cereola (2012) with a sample of the largest European companies 
and Crawford, Extance, Helliar and Powell (2012) with a U.K. sample.  
 
The results on the measures of the level of segment disaggregation and the level of 
information conveyed about cross-segment transfers further confirm that IFRS 8 did not 
increase the information content or the quality of segment reporting in Finland. None of 
the changes occurred due to IFRS 8 are found to be statistically significant, the means 
on the TRANSFER variable even showing some lost information on the cross-segment 
transfers. This is in line with the fact that the disclosure of capital expenditure dropped 
notably under IFRS 8, as seen in table 8. The significance of the loss of information on 
TRANSFER increases slightly after a robustness test that drops those companies that 
did not report the depreciation for their segments (see Appendix C). However, the loss 
of information is still found to be insignificant. Therefore hypotheses H3a and H3b are 
rejected.  
 
However, it has to be noted that the Finnish companies’ reporting on average seems 
quite extensive already under IAS 14R, at least according to the DISAGG variable. The 
average DISAGG of 0.57 means that on average Finnish companies reported 57 % more 
segments  than  the  number  of  different two-digit SIC codes would imply. This can be      
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Panel A: Whole sample
Means IAS 14R IFRS 8
Difference Between 
IAS14R and IFRS 8 
(Z-stat) p-value No. of Obs
Disaggregation
NSEG 2.58 2.65 0.07 0.567 110
(-0.573)
DISAGG 0.57 0.57 0.00 0.880 110
(-0.151)
HERF 0.67 0.68 0.01 0.368 110
(-0.900)
Cross-segment transfer
NLSEG 0.69 0.76 0.07 0.384 71
(-0.870)
TRANSFER 4.93 4.55 -0.38 0.397 65
(-0.848)
Panel B: Early adopters
Means IAS 14R IFRS 8
Difference Between 
IAS14R and IFRS 8 
(Z-stat) p-value No. of Obs
Disaggregation
NSEG 3.88 4.50 0.62 0.285 8
(-1.069)
DISAGG 0.84 0.98 0.14 0.326 8
(-0.981)
HERF 0.50 0.53 0.03 0.889 8
(-0.140)
Cross-segment transfer
NLSEG 0.63 1.00 0.37 0.083* 8
(-1.732)
TRANSFER 1.18 0.70 -0.48 0.917 8
(-0.105)
Panel C: Regular adopters
Means IAS 14R IFRS 8
Difference Between 
IAS14R and IFRS 8 
(Z-stat) p-value No. of Obs
Disaggregation
NSEG 2.48 2.50 0.02 0.937 102
(-0.079)
DISAGG 0.55 0.54 -0.01 0.770 102
(-0.293)
HERF 0.68 0.69 0.01 0.274 102
(-1.095)
Cross-segment transfer
NLSEG 0.70 0.73 0.03 0.793 63
(-0.263)
TRANSFER 5.46 5.09 -0.37 0.398 57
(-0.845)
* Significant at the 10% level (2-tailed test).
TABLE 11.
Univariate Analysis of the Reporting Changes in the Disaggregation and Cross-Segment Transfer Measures
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compared for instance to the results of Berger and Hann (2003), who found that after the 
introduction of SFAS No. 131 the average DISAGG value rose to 0.07.  
 
As panel C shows, the results are not affected when the early adopters are excluded 
from the sample, but rather confirm even more that IFRS 8 did not result in significant 
changes to companies’ reporting. For the regular adopters, the mean number of 
segments reported only changed from 2.48 to 2.50. Nevertheless, when comparing the 
results of the early adopters (panel B) to the regular ones, clear differences can be seen. 
On average, the early adopters report 2 whole segments more than the regular adopters, 
their average after IFRS 8 rising to 4.50 segments. However, not even for the early 
adopters is this increase found to be significant. 
 
In fact, the only change found to be marginally significant at p=0.083 is NLSEG for 
early adopters, indicating that some previously hidden loss-making segments were 
revealed after the introduction of IFRS 8. It is also worth noticing that the average 
increase on the number of loss segments reported is almost 59 % for the early adopters 
while the average increase in all segments reported is only 16 %. These results are in 
line with previous research that found that the management approach forced companies 
to reveal also low-performing segments (Berger & Hann 2003, Berger & Hann 2007).  
 
All in all, nor from the regular sample or the early adopters it can be said that IFRS 8 
significantly improved the disaggregation or cross-segment transfer metrics, therefore 
implying that the overall level of LOB segment reporting stayed fairly similar. 
However, it seems that the early adopters altered their reporting considerably more than 
the regular adopters, and also more significantly moved their segment reporting to the 
direction IASB would have hoped for. 
 
Table 12 shows the second set of univariate analysis for only those companies that 
continued to report LOB segments under IFRS 8. 90 out of the total 110 companies 
investigated (82 %) reported LOB segments, thus confirming previous results that it is 
the most common segment reporting format.  
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Panel A: Whole sample
Means IAS 14R IFRS 8
Difference Between 
IAS14R and IFRS 8 
(Z-stat) p-value No. of Obs
Disaggregation
NSEG 2.72 2.92 0.20 0.114 90
(-1.579)
DISAGG 0.63 0.68 0.05 0.185 90
(-1.324)
HERF 0.63 0.63 0.00 0.866 90
(-0.169)
Cross-segment transfer
NLSEG 0.78 0.81 0.03 0.384 69
(-0.870)
TRANSFER 4.90 4.68 -0.22 0.761 63
(-0.761)
Panel B: Early adopters
Means IAS 14R IFRS 8
Difference Between 
IAS14R and IFRS 8 
(Z-stat) p-value No. of Obs
Disaggregation
NSEG 3.71 4.86 1.15 0.046** 7
(-1.994)
DISAGG 0.88 1.18 0.30 0.063* 7
(-1.863)
HERF 0.48 0.46 -0.02 0.612 7
(-0.507)
Cross-segment transfer
NLSEG 0.71 1.14 0.43 0.083* 7
(-1.732)
TRANSFER 0.55 0.71 0.16 0.500 7
(-0.674)
Panel C: Regular adopters
Means IAS 14R IFRS 8
Difference Between 
IAS14R and IFRS 8 
(Z-stat) p-value No. of Obs
Disaggregation
NSEG 2.64 2.76 0.12 0.508 83
(-0.662)
DISAGG 0.61 0.65 0.04 0.543 83
(-0.608)
HERF 0.65 0.64 -0.01 0.863 83
(-0.173)
Cross-segment transfer
NLSEG 0.78 0.77 -0.01 0.793 62
(-0.263)
TRANSFER 5.44 5.18 -0.26 0.586 56
(-0.544)
** Significant at the 5% level (2-tailed test).
* Significant at the 10% level (2-tailed test).
TABLE 12.
Univariate Analysis of the Reporting Changes for LOB-reporting Firms
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As can be expected, when only LOB-reporting companies are included, the results are 
more positive. The average number of segments reported rose from 2.72 to 2.92, and 
also DISAGG and NLSEG variables show improved disclosure levels. However, again 
these changes are not statistically significant, and do not confirm H1 or H3. Indeed, 
when combining the results of the first set of tests it can be stated that the overall LOB-
reporting level stayed constant, and even the companies choosing to report LOB 
segments did not change their reporting significantly.  
 
However, the results on the 7 early adopters reporting LOB segments under IFRS 8 are 
more interesting. In this case I can find a statistically significant change in the number 
of reported segments, which rose from 3.71 to 4.86 on average. This result confirms the 
anticipation that those companies that knew they had to do changes to their reporting 
chose to do it before the standard became mandatory. The changes on DISAGG and 
NLSEG are also found to be marginally significant. 
 
Table 13 presents similar univariate analysis on the reported segment line items. As 
expected by the second hypothesis, the average line items reported fells from 8.64 to 
8.49 under IFRS 8 in the whole sample. This decrease is not found to be significant, 
unlike in the previous research (Nichols et al. 2012), therefore not confirming H2a.  
 
However, panels B and C show that the reaction to IFRS 8 regarding segment line items 
was completely different for the early adopters and regular adopters. For early adopters 
the number of line items actually increased from 10.25 to 12.13, whereas the decrease 
of the line items is deepened when only regular adopters are taken into consideration, 
the average falling from 8.46 to 8.07. This decrease is a lot more significant than with 
the whole sample, but H2a still remains unconfirmed.  
 
Table 13 also shows results regarding the reporting of specific segment line items. Only 
those changes are presented in the table, which were found to be statistically significant. 
The results regarding all the segment line items investigated and presented in table 8 can 
be found in Appendix D.  
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Panel A: Whole sample
Means IAS 14R IFRS 8
Difference Between 
IAS14R and IFRS 8 
(Z-stat) p-value No. of Obs
NSLI 8.64 8.49 -0.15 0.433 78
(-0.785)
Specific line items (only significant differences shown)
Segment assets 0.95 0.83 -0.12 0.013** 78
(-2.496)
Segment liabilities 0.82 0.68 -0.14 0.012** 78
(-2.524)
Capital expenditure 0.91 0.76 -0.15 0.001*** 78
(-3.464)
Equity method income 0.36 0.29 -0.07 0.096* 78
(-1.667)
Others 0.19 0.26 0.07 0.059* 78
(-1.890)
Panel B: Early adopters
Means IAS 14R IFRS 8
Difference Between 
IAS14R and IFRS 8 
(Z-stat) p-value No. of Obs
NSLI 10.25 12.13 1.88 0.138 8
(-1.483)
Specific line items (only significant differences shown)
Revenue from other segments 0.63 1.00 0.37 0.083* 8
(-1.732)
Panel C: Regular adopters
Means IAS 14R IFRS 8
Difference Between 
IAS14R and IFRS 8 
(Z-stat) p-value No. of Obs
NSLI 8.46 8.07 -0.39 0.141 70
(-1.471)
Specific line items (only significant differences shown)
Segment assets 0.94 0.81 -0.13 0.013** 70
(-2.496)
Segment liabilities 0.83 0.67 -0.16 0.008*** 70
(-2.668)
Capital expenditure 0.90 0.73 -0.17 0.001*** 70
(-3.464)
Equity method income 0.33 0.24 -0.09 0.034** 70
(-2.121)
*** Significant at the 1% level (2-tailed test).
** Significant at the 5% level (2-tailed test).
* Significant at the 10% level (2-tailed test).
TABLE 13.
Univariate Analysis of the Reporting Changes in the Segment Line Items by Multisegment Firms
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As expected in the discussion concerning the results of table 8, panel C of table 12 
shows that significant declines are found in the reporting of segment assets, segment 
liabilities, capital expenditure, and equity method income. Apart from the decline in the 
disclosure of segment assets, these same findings were also reported by Nichols, Street 
and Cereola (2012). It is curious to note that while Finnish companies continue to report 
equity method investment by segment, they do allocate the result of these investments to 
the segments. However, this might be a symptom of IFRS 8, as it requires the segments 
to be reported as they are reported to the management, and management may not make a 
lot of the segment’s profitability if it includes the results on an investment that is outside 
that segment’s ordinary business. 
 
As table 13 does not present the results on segment profitability measures, it can also be 
stated that H2b is discarded and that in Finland IFRS 8 did not increase the number of 
companies reporting more than single item of segment profitability. Indeed, the most 
important findings are the declines on the disclosure of segment assets, liabilities and 
capital expenditure. Especially capital expenditure is important when assessing the 
segment’s future inside the company, as it gives information on which segment the 
company is investing in and therefore focusing at the moment.  
 
Table 13 also again confirms that early adopters differ from the other sample. As 
discussed, their average number of line items reported actually increased, and none of 
the line items investigated experienced a significant decline in the reporting frequency. 
Results concerning the possible early adoption effect are therefore presented next.  
5.3 The Existence of the Early Adoption Effect 
 
Table 14 provides the results on the Mann-Whitney-U –test performed to investigate 
whether the reporting changes occurred in the regular adopter and early adopter sample 
differ significantly. As the mean changes for the investigation variables show, apart 
from HERF and TRANSFER variable the early adopters changed their reporting to a 
more favorable direction after IFRS 8. For example, the increase in the number of 
segments reported for the regular sample was only 0.02 segments, whereas for the early 
adopters it was 0.63 segments. In segment line items the changes occurred are even 
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completely opposite, as regular adopters decreased the number of line items reported 
while early adopters increased them. 
 
Means
Regular 
Adopters Early Adopters
Difference Between 
Regular and Early 
Adopters (Z-stat)
Mann-Whitney U Test 
p-value
  NSEG 0.02 0.63 0.61 0.015**
(-2.434)
  NSLI -0.26 1.88 2.14 0.042**
(-2.037)
  DISAGG -0.01 0.14 0.15 0.021**
(-2.313)
  HERF 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.356
(-0.923)
  NLSEG 0.01 0.38 0.37 0.014**
(-2.450)
  TRANSFER -0.37 -0.48 -0.11 0.284
(-1.072)
** Significant at the 5% level (2-tailed test).
TABLE 14.
An Analysis of the Differences in the Reporting Changes between Regular and Early Adopters of IFRS 8
 
 
The test results show that the reporting changes are significantly different in the changes 
occurred in the number of segments reported, number of line items reported, the level of 
segment disaggregation and the number of loss segments reported. These results 
confirm the anticipated early adoption effect of hypothesis H4 and suggest that early 
adopters started to use the standard earlier on because they knew they had to start 
disclosing more information about their segments.  
 
5.4 The Existence of the Size Effect 
 
Table 15 presents the Spearman rank correlations between the different size measures, 
segment reporting quality variables and the reporting change variables according to the 
normality test results. The results confirm expectations on the higher level of segmental 
disclosure by larger companies, as the number of segments reported, number of segment 
line items reported and the level of segment disaggregation measured by both DISAGG 
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and HERF under both reporting regimes are found to be increasing with size. However, 
there is no evidence that larger Finnish companies would report more about cross-
segment transfers, as the correlations between NLSEG and TRANSFER and the size 
variables are not significant.  
 
 
Regarding the reporting change that occurred after the change to IFRS 8, it seems that 
larger Finnish companies did not improve their segment reporting significantly more 
than smaller ones. The correlation coefficients are not of significant importance. The 
results therefore dictate that company size measured by market value, total assets or 
total sales did not significantly affect the way IFRS 8 was responded to. Therefore H5 is 
rejected, and it can be stated that regardless of the company size, Finnish companies 
reacted to IFRS 8 in a fairly similar manner. 
 
Market Value Total Assets Total Sales
IAS 14R
NSEG 0.481*** 0.529*** 0.557***
NSLI 0.421*** 0.460*** 0.467***
DISAGG 0.394*** 0.465*** 0.473***
HERF -0.489*** -0.544*** -0.572***
NLSEG -0.104 -0.024 0.000
TRANSFER -0.211* -0.109 0.085
IFRS 8
NSEG 0.447*** 0.510*** 0.539***
NSLI 0.470*** 0.526*** 0.563***
DISAGG 0.332*** 0.420*** 0.426***
HERF -0.441*** -0.508*** -0.535***
NLSEG 0.020 0.095 0.142
TRANSFER -0.120 0.001 -0.013
  NSEG 0.036 0.060 0.046
  NSLI 0.048 0.057 0.113
  DISAGG 0.033 0.055 0.044
  HERF 0.039 0.057 0.071
  NLSEG 0.103 0.103 0.115
  TRANSFER 0.041 0.087 0.076
*** Significant at the 1% level (2-tailed test).
** Significant at the 5% level (2-tailed test).
Spearman
TABLE 15.
Correlation Matrix for the Size and Reporting Quality Variables
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6 CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
6.1 Summary of the Results 
 
6.1.1 Segment Reporting Changes 
 
Overall, the results of the study show that IFRS 8 did not have a major impact to 
segment reporting practices in Finland. Out of the 110 sample companies examined, 
66 % did not change the amount of segments reported and also a great majority of 59 % 
left the amount of segment line items untouched. According to the results it also seems 
that companies making changes to their reporting balanced each other out, thus leaving 
the effect of the whole standard to LOB segments to be almost non-existent.  
 
Regarding the number of segments, there were only slightly more companies increasing 
the amount of segments reported (19 companies) than there were companies decreasing 
it (18 companies). These figures are reversed for the segment line items, where 25 
companies decreased the amount of items reported and only 20 companies increased it. 
Also against expectations, IFRS 8 did not succeed in increasing the amount of 
multisegment companies among the sample. In fact, the amount of single segment LOB 
companies increased by one from 35 under IAS 14R to 36 under IFRS 8.  
 
The univariate analysis conducted for the segment reporting variables using the 
Wilcoxon signed-ranks test further confirmed the mild effect of IFRS 8. The variables 
used to measure segment disaggregation level and the amount of information conveyed 
about cross-segment transfers both showed that no significant change after the adoption 
of the management approach had occurred. The mean of variable NSEG measuring the 
number of segments reported showed a small increase from 2.58 reported segments to 
2.65. Thus, at least on average IFRS 8 did not result in loss of information. Also 
DISAGG and HERF variables measuring the level of segment disaggregation basically 
showed a non-zero change. 
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For the cross-segment transfer variables NLSEG and TRANSFER the changes occurred 
were a bit more notable. The amount of loss segments reported rose from an average of 
0.69 segments under IAS 14R to 0.76 segments under IFRS 8. It is important to note 
that while the number of segments reported on average only rose by 2,7 %, the amount 
of loss-making segments reported on average rose by 10,1 %. This implies that even 
though the increase in the number of loss segments was not found to be statistically 
significant, there are implications that companies were more likely to hide loss-making 
segments than high-performing segments under the old segment reporting standard. 
 
Despite NLSEG showing an increased amount of information on cross-segment 
transfers, TRANSFER variable decreased from 4.93 under IAS 14R to 4.55 on average 
under IFRS 8, indicating lost information on cross-segment transfers. The decrease was 
not found to be of statistical significance. However, further investigation conducted on 
the disclosure of segment line items confirmed that lost information on cross-segment 
transfers was mainly due to companies withholding the disclosure of capital expenditure 
per segment. 
 
As expected by the descriptive statistics, the amount of segment line items dropped on 
average from 8.64 items per segment to 8.49 items per segment after IFRS 8, but this 
decrease was insignificant. However, some specific line items showed statistically very 
significant decreases in their disclosure levels. These items were the segment assets, 
segment liabilities, capital expenditure and equity method income. All of these items 
were specifically required to be disclosed under IAS 14R, but IFRS 8 did not anymore 
include these disclosure requirements. 
 
All in all, the statistical analysis conducted shows that the reporting changes IFRS 8 
generated were not found to be statistically significant, apart from the decreases in the 
disclosure of segment assets, segment liabilities, capital expenditure and equity method 
income per segment. Thus, hypotheses H1, H2 and H3 are rejected, and in general the 
information level and quality of LOB segment reporting stayed constant among Finnish 
companies even after the standard change. 
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6.1.2 Early Adopters vs. Regular Adopters 
 
The research sample included both companies that had adopted IFRS 8 early and 
companies that adopted it when its use became mandatory. Hypothesis H4 assumed that 
the reporting changes for the early adopters would be greater than for the regular 
adopters. The Mann-Whitney-U-test conducted to test the differences between these two 
sub-samples confirmed that while for the regular adopters IFRS 8 had resulted in few 
changes, the changes were more notable and also more favorable among the early 
adopters, confirming H4. In particular, when investigating only LOB-reporting early 
adopters, it was found that the number of segments reported increased significantly. 
Previously under IAS 14R the early adopters reported on average 3.71 segments, but 
after IFRS 8 this number was increased to 4.86. This is clear evidence that IFRS 8 for at 
least some companies increased the segment reporting transparency. 
 
Also overall the effect of IFRS 8 was greater for early adopters. While the increase in 
NSEG for the regular adopters was only 0.02 segments, for the early adopters the 
corresponding figure was 0.63 segments, thus showing the greater impact of IFRS 8 to 
their reporting. Regarding segment line items, changes in NSLI variable showed even 
opposite reactions, as regular adopters decreased the amount of line items reported by 
0.26 line items, while early adopters increased them by 1.88. Also the changes in 
DISAGG and NLSEG variables showed statistically significant differences between 
these two groups, with the early adopters improving their segment disaggregation level 
and disclosing more loss segments. However, both for the early adopters and regular 
adopters the TRANSFER variable showed decreased amount of information on cross-
segment transfers. 
 
6.1.3 Reporting Changes and Company Size 
 
The final issue investigated in the study aimed to compare whether company size had 
affected the reporting changes done after IFRS 8. Correlation analysis was used to 
analyze this issue, and company size was measured with three different size variables, 
total sales, total assets and market capitalization. As expected, the correlation analysis 
showed that both under IAS 14R and IFRS 8 larger companies reported more segments, 
more line items and had more disaggregated segment information as measured by 
DISAGG and HERF. However, there was no evidence that larger companies would 
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report more information about cross-segment transfers, as correlations between NLSEG 
and TRANSFER and the size variables were not found to be significant.  
 
Contrary to the expectations of hypothesis H5, the reporting changes were not found to 
be significantly correlated with company size. In fact, the evidence suggests that 
regardless of company size, Finnish companies reacted to the new segment reporting 
standard in a fairly similar manner.  
6.2 The Results in Light of Previous Research 
 
The research results obtained in this study partly confirm the findings of earlier 
research, but also partly contradict them. Most importantly, the amount of segments 
reported did not increase in Finnish companies’ reporting after IFRS 8, unlike for 
instance in the United Kingdom (Crawford et al. 2012) and among the largest European 
companies (Nichols et al. 2012). This result is also contradictory to the effect that the 
management approach had in the United States (Berger & Hann 2003, Hermann & 
Thomas 2000, Street et al. 2000).  
 
These findings are interesting, because this study incorporated a sample that included 
smaller companies than the previous IFRS 8 studies had investigated. Therefore the 
results show that the effect of IFRS 8 was not universal but depends on many factors, 
and that partly the criticism placed on IFRS 8 about harming smaller companies 
commercially could be true. The findings may confirm the notion reported by for 
instance Kvaal and Nobes (2012) that despite accounting practice harmonization, the 
reporting practices differ from country to country. Alternative explanation is that the 
differing empirical findings in current study are driven by the smaller firms included in 
the sample compared to prior studies. 
 
In addition, the results show that IFRS 8 did not succeed in increasing the level of 
segment disaggregation or the amount of information about cross-segment transfers in 
Finland. These results were unexpected, because in the United States the management 
approach enforced with SFAS No. 131 increased the level of segment disaggregation, 
more information about cross-segment transfers was released and thus segment 
reporting information became more value-relevant (Berger & Hann 2003, Chen & 
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Zhang 2003). In light of these previous results, it can be concluded that the quality 
effect of IFRS 8 to Finnish companies’ reporting was low. 
 
Nonetheless, some of the results also confirmed the findings of earlier research. As 
previously reported by Crafword, Extance, Helliar and Power (2012) and Nichols, Street 
and Cereola (2012), the amount of reported segment line items decreased. Even if this 
decrease was not found to be significant, some specific line items showed very 
significantly lowered disclosure levels. As dictated by previous research (Nichols et al. 
2012), these items included segment assets, segment liabilities, capital expenditure and 
equity method income. However, contrary to earlier research Finnish companies did not 
significantly increase the amount of profitability measures disclosed per each segment.  
 
Also in line with previous research (Berger & Hann 2003), Finnish companies 
introduced more new loss-making segments than new profitable segments after the 
adoption of IFRS 8. This implies that under the old standard it was more probable that 
the management chose to aggregate loss-making segments into other segments than that 
they would have withheld from reporting high-performing segments, in accordance with 
the agency theory. With the introduction of SFAS No. 131 in the United States, similar 
results were reported by Berger and Hann (2007).  
 
Finally, the results added to previous research on companies’ strategic choices regarding 
financial disclosure and the size effect to the disclosure levels. According to earlier 
research that companies pose strategic behavior towards their disclosure choices (Hayes 
& Lundholm 1996), the results show that those companies that knew they had to make 
larger changes to their reporting chose to do it rather as early as possible than only when 
the change became mandatory. Regarding the size effect it was found that larger 
companies reported higher quality segment information under both reporting regimes, 
confirming earlier findings (Lang & Lundholm 1993, Aitken et al. 1997, Ettredge et al. 
2005, Nichols & Street 2007). All the same, the size was not found to have an effect on 
how the companies reacted to the standard change. 
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6.3 Practical Implications 
 
The results of this research also provide some practical implications for the 
consideration of for instance FIN-FSA and also IASB, which has finalized the PIR 
process on IFRS 8, but continues to address some of the most problematic issues also 
highlighted by this research (IASB 2013b). The results are also of interest to the 
investors investing in Finnish companies, as segment reporting is key to their decision-
making (Yoo & Semenenko 2012).  
 
This study shows that despite the hopes that FIN-FSA (2007) placed on the standard 
change, segment reporting remained very similar as before and only 3 of the previous 
single-segment companies turned to multisegment companies under IFRS 8. As FIN-
FSA found that the level of segment disclosures was unsatisfactory even under IAS 
14R, they are bound to find it as that still after the new approach. 
 
There are a number of reasons that might have affected these results. For instance, IASB 
(2013b) acknowledges that some companies might already have aligned their segments 
according to the internal reporting under IAS 14R, and for this reason the effect of IFRS 
8 was not as notable as expected. I find this explanation to suit the situation, as I found 
that in many annual reports investigated companies reported that IFRS 8 resulted in no 
change in their reporting because the segments had already been reported according to 
the management approach under IAS 14R.  
 
Nevertheless, there are other possible explanations. For example ESMA (2011) 
highlighted the difficulties that companies have in defining the CODM, and IASB 
(2013b) has raised this issue under further investigation. As Finnish companies are also 
relatively small in size, and small companies were expected to be at a disadvantage with 
the new standard, I find it possible that companies have taken advantage of the loose 
definition of the term CODM, and raised the level of reporting so high, that the segment 
reporting reported outside is not as disaggregated as it should be. This interpretation is 
in line with the findings that auditors have reported increased tension with their clients 
while agreeing what to include in the annual reports (IASB 2013a).  
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Another possibility is that Finnish companies have aggregated segments that should not 
be aggregated by hiding behind the aggregation criteria that for example ESMA (2011) 
has criticized. This criteria state that segments containing ‘similar economic 
characteristics’ can be aggregated into one segment. There have been claims that 
companies do not specifically enough disclose what aggregation criteria they have used, 
and I find this to be the case with the Finnish companies investigated. Thus, it is 
possible that these companies have decided to understand the aggregation criteria at its 
most relaxed form. IASB (2013b) is also further researching this issue. 
 
The final great practical impact that I find these results show is the fact that IFRS 8 has 
somewhat made investment analysis more difficult. This is mainly because the level of 
disclosure for capital expenditure per segment dropped significantly. This is grave news 
because capital expenditure gives information on what segment the company is 
currently focusing on. It also has to be noted that the comparability between companies 
has decreased, as there is more reporting variability than there was with IAS 14R, as 
one company discloses one item but the other one does not.  
 
6.4 Evaluation of the Results 
 
This study has a number of limitations affecting the generalizability of the obtained 
results. Firstly, as the research objective was to investigate the reporting changes in 
Finland, my sample only included Finnish listed companies. As financial reporting 
practices differ from country to country (Kvaal & Nobes 2012), caution must be applied 
when these results are generalized to any other economies.  
 
Secondly, the study only investigated the reporting changes in the line-of-business 
segment reporting. Thus, as geographic segments were ruled out of the scope of the 
study, the results cannot be considered to give a full view on what was the effect of 
IFRS 8 to Finnish companies’ segment reporting. However, as most companies report 
their segments according to the LOB classification (e.g. Nichols et al. 2012), this 
limitation can be considered reasonable. In addition, the robustness of the main findings 
was examined and confirmed using a reduced sample reporting their segments 
according to the LOB classification. 
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Finally, there exists a possibility of measurement error in the data utilized, because I 
hand-collected it from the annual reports of the sample companies. Moreover, it is 
possible that not all companies whose segment reporting data contained contamination 
due to acquisitions or divestments were eliminated. In total 19 companies were found to 
have possible contamination using Berger and Hann’s algorithm (2003), but only two of 
these were excluded. If these companies’ annual reports did not report on acquisitions, 
divestments, they were still included in the final sample. Nevertheless, the probability 
for companies to leave structure changes out of the annual reports can be considered 
low, and so also the limitation as narrow.  
 
6.5 Further Research 
 
There are many fruitful options for further research as showed by this study. As a first 
option it could be interesting to examine whether the changes in geographical segment 
reporting in Finland were similar compared to the results obtained in this study. Another 
option could be to investigate whether a similar early adoption effect can be found with 
a larger sample of regular and early adopters from different economies. Moreover, the 
vast research done on the effects of SFAS No. 131 provide wide possibilities for further 
research. As noted by the IASB (2013a), much more information is still needed on how 
IFRS 8 affected the analysts’ information environment, e.g. whether their estimation 
errors were reduced, and also on the effect it had on the stock market, e.g. whether the 
cost of equity capital decreased.  
 
Besides these quantitative research options, the subject can also be extended to 
qualitative research. For instance, the reasons behind choosing to adopt the standard 
early could be an interesting subject to investigate. Other possible research problems 
include examining the changes the standard change had on auditors’ work and also the 
companies’ view on whether filling the requirements of the standard puts the into a 
competitively harmful position.   
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A 
Companies Included in the Initial Sample 
   Company Early adoption Deleted for 
Affecto Oyj No   
Ahlström Oyj No 
 Aktia Oyj No Always IFRS 8 
Alma Media Oyj No 
 Amer Sports Oyj No  
Apetit Oyj No 
 Aspo Oyj No  
Aspocomp Group Oyj No 
 Atria Oyj No  
Basware Oyj No 
 Biohit Oyj No  
Biotie Therapies Corp. No 
 CapMan Oyj No  
Cargotec Oyj No 
 Cencorp Oyj No  
Citycon Oyj No 
 Componenta Oyj No  
Comptel Oyj No 
 Cramo Oyj No  
Digia Oyj No 
 Dovre Group Oyj No  
Efore Oyj No 
 Elecster Oyj No  
Elektrobit Oyj No 
 Elisa Oyj No  
Endomines No Always IFRS 8 
EQ Oyj No   
Etteplan Oyj No 
 Exel Composites Oyj No Divestments 
F-Secure Oyj No 
 Finnair Oyj No  
Finnlines Oyj No 
 Fiskars Oyj  Yes  
Fortum Oyj Yes 
 Geosentric Oyj No  
Glaston Oyj  No 
 HKScan Oyj No  
Honkarakenne Oyj No 
 Huhtamäki Oyj Yes  
Ilkka-Yhtymä Oyj No 
 Incap Oyj No  
Innofactor Oyj No 
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Ixonos Oyj No   
Kemira Oyj No 
 Keskisuomalainen Oyj No  
Kesko Oyj No 
 Kesla Oyj No  
KONE Oyj No 
 Konecranes Oyj No  
Lassila & Tikanoja Oyj No 
 Lemminkäinen Oyj No  
Marimekko Oyj No 
 Martela Oyj No  
Metso Oyj No 
 Metsä Board Oyj No  
Neo Industrial Oyj No 
 Neste Oil Oyj Yes  
Nokia Oyj Yes 
 Nokian Renkaat Oyj No  
Nordea Bank Plc No Bank 
Norvestia Oyj No   
Nurminen Logistics Oyj No 
 Okmetic Oyj No  
Olvi Oyj No 
 Oral Hammaslääkärit Oyj No  
Oriola-KD Oyj No 
 Orion Oyj No  
Outokumpu Oyj No 
 Outotec Oyj No  
Panostaja Oyj No 
 PKC Group Oyj No  
Pohjois-Karjalan Kirjapaino Oyj No 
 Pohjola Bank Plc Yes Bank 
Ponsse Oyj No 
 Pöyry Oyj No  
QPR Software Oyj No 
 Raisio Oyj No Divestments 
Ramirent Oyj No 
 Rapala VMC Oyj No  
Rautaruukki Oyj No 
 Raute Oyj No  
Revenio Group Oyj No 
 Ruukki Group Oyj No  
Saga Furs Oyj No 
 Sampo Oyj No  
Sanoma Oyj No 
 Scanfil Oyj No Always IFRS 8 
Sievi Capital Oyj No 
 Solteq Oyj No  
Sotkamo Silver No Always IFRS 8 
Sponda Oyj No   
  80 
SRV Yhtiöt Oyj Yes Always IFRS 8 
SSH Communications Security Oyj No   
SSK Suomen Säästäjien Kiinteistöt Oyj No 
 Stockmann Oyj Abp No  
Stonesoft Oyj No 
 Stora Enso Oyj No  
Suominen Oyj No 
 Takoma Oyj Yes Always IFRS 8 
Talentum Oyj No 
 Talvivaaran Kaivososakeyhtiö Oyj No  
Technopolis Oyj No 
 Tecnotree Oyj No  
Teleste Oyj No 
 TeliaSonera Plc Yes  
Tieto Oyj No 
 Tiimari Oyj Yes  
Tikkurila Oyj No Always IFRS 8 
Trainer's House Oyj No   
Tulikivi Oyj No 
 Turvatiimi Oyj No  
UPM-Kymmene Oyj Yes 
 Uponor Oyj No  
Vaahto Group Oyj  No 
 Vacon Oyj No  
Vaisala Oyj No 
 Viking Line Abp No  
Wulff-Yhtiöt Oyj No 
 Wärtsilä Oyj No  
YIT Oyj No 
 Yleiselektroniikka Oyj No  
Ålandsbanken Abp No Bank 
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Statistic Sig. Statistic Sig. No. of Obs
IAS 14R
NSEG 0.201 0.000*** 0.871 0.000*** 110
NSLI 0.107 0.027** 0.962 0.021** 78
DISAGG 0.189 0.000*** 0.934 0.000*** 110
HERF 0.213 0.000*** 0.867 0.000*** 110
NLSEG 0.309 0.000*** 0.746 0.000*** 75
TRANSFER 0.339 0.000*** 0.439 0.000*** 65
IFRS 8
NSEG 0.197 0.000*** 0.768 0.000*** 110
NSLI 0.105 0.032** 0.967 0.039** 78
DISAGG 0.150 0.000*** 0.953 0.000*** 110
HERF 0.220 0.000*** 0.864 0.000*** 110
NLSEG 0.269 0.000*** 0.719 0.000*** 74
TRANSFER 0.351 0.000*** 0.413 0.000*** 65
*** Significant at the 1% level (2-tailed test).
** Significant at the 5% level (2-tailed test).
APPENDIX B
Tests of Normality for Test Variables
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk
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Panel A: Whole sample
Means IAS 14R IFRS 8
Difference Between 
IAS14R and IFRS 8 
(Z-stat) p-value No. of Obs
TRANSFER 5.17 4.64 -0.53 0.219 62
(-1.229)
Panel B: Early adopters
Means IAS 14R IFRS 8
Difference Between 
IAS14R and IFRS 8 
(Z-stat) p-value No. of Obs
TRANSFER 1.34 0.80 -0.54 0.917 7
(-0.105)
Panel C: Regular adopters
Means IAS 14R IFRS 8
Difference Between 
IAS14R and IFRS 8 
(Z-stat) p-value No. of Obs
TRANSFER 5.66 5.13 -0.53 0.199 55
(-1.285)
APPENDIX C
Univariate Analysis on TRANSFER  with Companies Reporting Depreciation Per Segment
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Panel A: Whole sample
Means IAS 14R IFRS 8
Difference Between 
IAS14R and IFRS 8 
(Z-stat) p-value No. of Obs
Profit/loss items
Profitability measure 0.86 0.87 0.01 0.705 78
(-0.378)
Revenue from external customers 0.96 0.95 -0.01 0.705 78
(-0.378)
Revenue from other segments 0.60 0.62 0.02 0.782 78
(-0.277)
Interest revenue 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.157 78
(-1.414)
Interest expense 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.157 78
(-1.414)
Depreciation/Amortization 0.79 0.81 0.02 0.705 78
(-0.378)
Income tax expense/benefit 0.01 0.01 0.00 1.000 78
(0.000)
Other significant non-cash expenses 0.38 0.35 -0.03 0.180 78
(-1.342)
Balance sheet information
Equity method investment 0.37 0.38 0.01 0.739 78
(-0.333)
Voluntary disclosures
Additional income statement detail 0.08 0.08 0.00 1.000 78
(0.000)
Additional balance sheet detail 0.14 0.12 -0.02 0.157 78
(-1.414)
Cash flow information 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.564 78
(-0.577)
Non-recurring items 0.10 0.15 0.05 0.102 78
(-1.633)
Goodwill 0.09 0.09 0.00 1.000 78
(0.000)
Employees 0.24 0.24 0.00 1.000 78
(0.000)
Orders/Order book 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.157 78
(-1.414)
APPENDIX D
The Non-Significant Reporting Changes in the Segment Line Items 
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Panel B: Early adopters
Means IAS 14R IFRS 8
Difference Between 
IAS14R and IFRS 8 
(Z-stat) p-value No. of Obs
Profit/loss items
Profitability measure 0.88 1.00 0.12 0.317 8
(-1.000)
Revenue from external customers 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.000 8
(0.000)
Interest revenue 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.000 8
(0.000)
Interest expense 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.000 8
(0.000)
Depreciation/Amortization 0.75 1.00 0.25 0.157 8
(-1.414)
Equity method income 0.63 0.75 0.12 1.000 78
(0.000)
Income tax expense/benefit 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.000 8
(0.000)
Other significant non-cash expenses 0.75 0.63 -0.12 0.317 8
(-1.000)
Balance sheet information
Segment assets 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.000 8
(0.000)
Segment liabilities 0.75 0.75 0.00 1.000 8
(0.000)
Equity method investment 0.63 0.63 0.00 1.000 8
(0.000)
Capital expenditure 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.000 8
(0.000)
Voluntary disclosures
Additional income statement detail 0.13 0.13 0.00 1.000 8
(0.000)
Additional balance sheet detail 0.25 0.25 0.00 1.000 8
(0.000)
Cash flow information 0.00 0.13 0.13 0.317 8
(-1.000)
Non-recurring items 0.38 0.63 0.25 0.157 8
(-1.414)
Goodwill 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.000 8
(0.000)
Employees 0.13 0.38 0.25 0.157 8
(-1.414)
Orders/Order book 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.000 8
(0.000)
Others 0.38 0.50 0.12 0.317 8
(-1.000)
APPENDIX D
The Non-Significant Reporting Changes in the Segment Line Items 
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Panel C: Regular adopters
Means IAS 14R IFRS 8
Difference Between 
IAS14R and IFRS 8 
(Z-stat) p-value No. of Obs
Profit/loss items
Profitability measure 0.86 0.86 0.00 1.000 70
(0.000)
Revenue from external customers 0.96 0.94 -0.02 0.705 70
(-0.378)
Revenue from other segments 0.60 0.57 -0.03 0.527 70
(-0.632)
Interest revenue 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.157 70
(-1.414)
Interest expense 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.157 70
(-1.414)
Depreciation/Amortization 0.80 0.79 -0.01 0.655 70
(-0.447)
Income tax expense/benefit 0.01 0.01 0.00 1.000 70
(0.000)
Other significant non-cash expenses 0.34 0.31 -0.03 0.317 70
(-1.000)
Balance sheet information
Equity method investment 0.34 0.36 0.02 0.705 70
(-0.378)
Voluntary disclosures
Additional income statement detail 0.07 0.07 0.00 1.000 70
(0.000)
Additional balance sheet detail 0.13 0.10 -0.03 0.157 70
(-1.414)
Cash flow information 0.06 0.06 0.00 1.000 70
(0.000)
Non-recurring items 0.07 0.10 0.03 0.317 70
(-1.000)
Goodwill 0.10 0.10 0.00 1.000 70
(0.000)
Employees 0.26 0.23 -0.03 0.414 70
(0.816)
Orders/Order book 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.157 70
(-1.414)
Others 0.17 0.23 0.06 0.102 70
(-1.633)
APPENDIX D
The Non-Significant Reporting Changes in the Segment Line Items 
 
